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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem of Nuclear Proliferation 
Nuclear weapons are classed as weapons of mass destruction because of their ability to 
indiscriminately inflict massive damage.1 Despite continued attempts by the US and 
other countries to integrate them into conventional force structures, for the most part, they 
have been defined by scholars, politicians and militaries as unconventional and unusable." 
Their only value lies in not using them. In 1996 the International Court of Justice even 
declared that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons" was generally unlawful except in 
extreme instances of self-defense.3 No nation has employed nuclear weapons during a 
conflict since World War II despite numerous conflicts with nonnuclear states.4 A type of 
'Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons. 
2Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th 
ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 33. This statement 
does not reflect the view of all states, leaders or militaries as reflected in the continued 
drive by some states to develop nuclear weapons. See also Herman Kahn, Thinking 
About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 38. 
3Mike Moore, "World Court Says Mostly No to Nuclear Weapons," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 52, no.5 (September 1996): 39. 
4T.V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 39 (December 1995): 697. 
1 
2 
taboo against their use has developed because they violate both ethical considerations and 
the principle of proportional retaliation.5 This principle states that a state must respond to 
aggression with a level of force in proportion to the original act of aggression. 
Despite the fact that they have not been used in over fifty years, the spread of nuclear 
weapons is considered a problem by the majority of states because of the fear that 
proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear warfare. Nuclear proliferation can be 
defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear device by any state. By this definition, 
the creation of one nuclear device by any state, including those already possessing them, 
constitutes proliferation. This definition acknowledges both the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of proliferation. Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear 
technology by states not currently possessing it. Vertical proliferation refers to increases 
in existing arsenals. Both types of proliferation are thought to increase the chance of 
nuclear use. 
States which have newly acquired nuclear weapons may not have the secunty arrange¬ 
ments necessary to safeguard against unintentional use, theft, or accidents.6 These states 
may also be engaged in enduring conflicts which increase the likelihood that nuclear 
weapons may be used. Studies of deterrence suggest that it may not be applicable in all 
5Ibid., 698; and, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The 
Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in The Culture of National Secunty: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), 114-152. 
6Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 75-85. 
7Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing 
Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review 87 (March 1993): 61-73. 
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situations, especially if a state is unable to create a secure second strike capability.8 
Finally, norms of nonuse which have developed among the acknowledged nuclear states 
may not be as salient to the identities of new nuclear nations.9 Vertical proliferation also 
increases the chance that nuclear weapons will be used. The more time and resources a 
state has devoted to the development of a large nuclear arsenal, the more it may be forced 
to depend upon it and justify its development. A nuclear war between two large arsenals 
would probably not remain limited to one or two weapons but employ hundreds. 
There is an alternative theory of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics 
which sees nuclear weapons as a stabilizing force.10 The crux of this argument is that 
nuclear weapons have been the cause of the "long peace" among Western nations since 
World War II and that if every nation possessed them states would find the costs of 
waging war too high. The result would be global peace. Even if this theory was found to 
be accurate, it highlights the other problem associated with the spread of nuclear weap¬ 
ons. Proliferation limits the ability of states to act in the international system. For 
instance, if all states possessed nuclear weapons they may not engage in warfare, but they 
would also be prevented from engaging in many other activities such as humanitarian 
interventions and acting to stop ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses and environmental 
degradation. A world free from international warfare would not mean a world free from 
violence and conflict. 
8Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 66-68. 
9Price and Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence," 125. 
10Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1-45. 
4 
The US has generally opposed the spread of nuclear weapons for both of these 
reasons. The most feared consequence of nuclear proliferation has been the possibility 
that nuclear weapons would be used by an enemy, terrorists or an irresponsible leader 
against the US or its allies. Yet the US also realizes that proliferation would severely 
limit its ability to pursue its goals and interests internationally." 
The US has also opposed the spread of nuclear weapons because it fears a prolifera¬ 
tion domino effect. A strong argument exists that the USSR developed nuclear weapons 
in response to the US, which in turn motivated China, India, and Pakistan to develop 
nuclear weapons.12 There are several reasons why states seek to develop nuclear weapons 
such as prestige, technological momentum, and domestic factors.13 Yet, security 
concerns are the predominate reason why a state begins to develop nuclear weapons.'4 
All states originally began their programs in response to perceived threats. When an 
enemy develops nuclear weapons, it increases the insecurity of other states and may push 
them to develop nuclear weapons. 
Although the US's main goal in promoting nonproliferation was self-interest, there 
also existed the concern that these weapons presented a danger to humanity. The moral 
and ethical dilemmas of possessing weapons of mass destruction influenced its decision 
"Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies 4 (Spring 1995): 465. 
l2Ronald J. Bee, Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold-War Challenge, Headline 
Series, no.303 (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 14. 
"Gary T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 
1994), 80. 
l4Thayer, The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, 482. 
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to advocate nonproliferation. This concern can be seen in such proposals as the Baruch 
Plan which proposed placing all nuclear materials under international controls.15 
Theory and Practice in US Policy 
In theory, the US considers all proliferation a threat to its national interests and 
opposes the spread of nuclear weapons to any state. Though mainly concerned with hori¬ 
zontal proliferation, it also advocates, in theory, the reduction of current nuclear arsenals, 
including its own, in the interest of promoting nonproliferation and reducing the threat of 
nuclear war. Yet the history of US nonproliferation policy clearly reveals a gap between 
theory and practice. The US has not consistently opposed proliferation among nuclear or 
nonnuclear states. The nuclear programs of some states have been ignored while others 
have incurred harsh military and economic sanctions. Technology has been denied to 
nonnuclear states while the nuclear powers continued to build their arsenals. These 
discrepancies have been a noted feature of US nonproliferation policy for the last fifty 
years and have led to the characterization of its policy as "ambivalent, equivocal, and 
selective."16 
15Peter A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to 
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1993), 17. 
Some scholars argue that the US never intended the Baruch Plan senously and only 
proposed it to ensure that the Soviet Union rejected it. See Gregg Herken, The Winning 
Weapon (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 181-182. 
'
6Clausen, Nonproliferation, xii. 
6 
Due to the prominent role the US plays in global nonprohferation, some scholars find 
this discrimination counterproductive and believe it undermines support for nonprohfera¬ 
tion within the international community.17 A state which has chosen to forego nuclear 
weapons may rethink its position if it believes that other states are being provided with 
the opportunity to build nuclear weapons. Several states, most notably India, have 
pointed to discriminatory standards as a basis for opposition to US led nonprohferation 
initiatives such as the Treaty on the Nonprohferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They believe that the only way to create an 
international climate in which nuclear weapons are perceived as illegitimate and unpro¬ 
ductive is to hold all states to the same standards and uniformly apply nonprohferation 
policies. 
US policymakers, however, often consider discrimination a natural consequence of 
foreign policy making. While they may agree that discrimination sometimes does not 
promote nonprohferation, they feel that all policy must be subject to a "political rational¬ 
ity" in which trade-offs and compromises are necessary to balance the competing 
interests of the state whether they be economic, strategic, or political.18 They believe US 
policy should discriminate because it serves the self-interest of the state. While both 
sides of this debate make valid points, the purpose of this study is not to resolve whether 
17Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapon 
States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today 24, no.6 (July 1994): 3- 
9; and, Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on 
Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Affairs 74, no.l (January/February 1995): 14. 
18Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 21. 
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or not US policy should discriminate, but instead aims to explore why the US chooses to 
discriminate against some states and not others. 
Although bias has been present in US nonproliferation policy since the creation of the 
bomb, this thesis will focus upon policy since the end of the Cold War for two reasons. 
First, nonproliferation has become a high priority on the foreign policy agenda, especially 
in the Clinton administration. The issue not only receives more attention, but more 
resources, monetary and military, are devoted to it. Second, the biases in US policy have 
become more evident. Since the early 1990s the US has focused its nonproliferation 
efforts upon a group of states which it has termed "rogue" or "outlaw" states. No 
concrete definition exists for what a rogue state is nor is the list of states in this category 
static; however, all are defined by their ambitions to create or develop nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons.19 The states most often identified as rogues are Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
and North Korea.20 These states have been subject not only to US sanctions and export 
controls, but potentially to military action to prevent and slow their nuclear programs. In 
contrast, other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel have been subject to far fewer 
reprisals and recriminations than the advanced nature of their programs should warrant. 
All three are acknowledged to already possess nuclear weapons and India and Pakistan 
have openly tested. 
l9Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New 
Foreign Policy (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), 23. 
20Occasionally Syria, Algeria, and Cuba are included in this category. Cuba is the 
only state not commonly considered to be pursuing nuclear weapons. 
Social Identity Theory 
8 
Why has the US chosen to focus its nonproliferation efforts upon the so-called rogue 
states and exert much less pressure against de facto nuclear states? Realist explanations 
which focus upon the material capability of states do not explain US policy because from 
a material stand point India, Pakistan, and Israel are better equipped to threaten the US 
with nuclear weapons. Other explanations which focus upon the national interest also fail 
to explain US policy because they do not explain exactly what the national interest is. 
Without a basis for determining what the national interest is, this type of explanation 
becomes tautological and can be used to explain almost any US policy. 
This thesis intends to apply social identity theory as an explanation for why the US 
applies discriminatory standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory suggests 
that how the US defines its interests and perceives threat is influenced by its group 
memberships and identity.21 In short, states form groups based on shared identities and 
the need to protect and enhance this group identity leads to collectively held perceptual 
biases. This study will focus upon one type of misperception, attribution bias. Attribu¬ 
tion bias says that a state will attribute the bad behavior of an enemy to the internal 
character of the enemy and not to external or situational factors such as security 
21
 See Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychol¬ 
ogy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
concerns.22 These cognitive biases can lead to overestimations of threat which may lead 
to discriminatory standards and excessive policy options such as military strikes. 
Social identity theory downplays the influence of the international system on US 
foreign policy and focuses upon the domestic determinants of policy. This "second 
image" approach argues that the internal structure and characteristics of the state, such as 
identity, determine state behavior.23 This theory provides a better explanation for US 
policy in several ways. It explains the imbalance between threat perception and capabil¬ 
ity in US policy. It also accounts for the US's exaggerated perception of the rogue states 
as the greatest current threat to international peace and security by clarifying how the US 
defines its national interest. 
A better understanding of the cognitive biases affecting policymakers is important 
because perception influences judgment and judgment is integral to policy making. 
Misperceptions on the part of policymakers can lead to the adoption of harsh nonprolifer- 
ation policies which may actually encourage proliferation and discourage policy options 
which deal with the underlying reasons for proliferation. The intense focus upon the 
rogue states may encourage them to continue their nuclear programs by giving them 
recognition and attention. Thus, if policy is to be improved, both academics and policy¬ 
makers can benefit from "a better understanding of how their own beliefs and tacit 
assumptions about the international system, international politics, and other actors in the 
22Robert Jervis, Perception andMisperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 35-48. 
23Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959), 125. 
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state system influence their perception of developments, their diagnoses of situations, and 
their judgments."24 
Many factors influence US nonproliferation policy and the decisions of policymakers 
to apply discriminatory standards. The cognitive biases generated by the social identity 
of a state represent only some of these factors. Throughout this study other factors which 
influence the process such as domestic, economic, and international issues will be dis¬ 
cussed to help explain US policy; however, many of these factors are influenced by 
cognitive biases because these biases influence how the national interest is defined. 
The application of psychological theory to nonproliferation policy is relatively unex¬ 
plored and therefore this thesis will only begin an inquiry into the subject by establishing 
the existence of attribution bias. While most scholars acknowledge the existence of 
biases within US policy, there has been little work on why they exist beyond references 
to the national interest. Social identity theory has been used to explain the psychology 
behind the formation of the nonproliferation regime.25 This thesis adopts the same 
premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses 
more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy. This study will not detail the 
nuclear programs of the states included in the study beyond what is necessary to establish 
a background for the reader. Many books have been written on the subject with much 
24George, Bridging the Gap, 14. 
25Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," 
The Journal of Politics 57 (August 1995): 743-775. 
11 
greater detail than could be accomplished here.26 What it will do is provide support for 
an alternative explanation for the biases in US nonproliferation policy and link it to the 
policy choices of decisionmakers. 
26See Leonard S. Spector, and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Michael J. Mazarr, 
North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996); Alan Friedman, Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House 
Illegally Armed Iraq (New York: Bantam Books, 1993); and, Mitchell Reiss, Bridled 
Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). 
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORY OF US NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 
The application of discriminatory standards has been a feature of US nonproliferation 
policy since 1945. Although its policy has evolved from strict technology denial and 
bilateral arrangements to support for the international nonproliferation regime and 
universal standards, it has continued to apply its policies selectively in order to advance 
other goals. Discriminatory standards were usually justified by the Cold War and the 
need to defend US interests. Yet the history of US policy reveals patterns of bias which 
have continued into the policies of the 1990s despite the end of the Cold War with the 
USSR. 
The Development of Policy: 1945-1989 
The US's first attempts to prevent proliferation centered around technology denial 
and control. The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was passed in 1946 which restricted all data 
and technology related to the production or use of fissile materials for both peaceful and 
military purposes.1 The exception to this act was Great Britain which did receive 
'Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 15. 
12 
13 
technological aid from the US in the early stages of its program.2 The AEA reflected the 
widespread belief within the scientific and military communities that control over 
uranium sources, then thought to be very limited, and denial of technology were the keys 
to preventing proliferation.3 In 1949 this belief was shattered when the USSR tested its 
first nuclear device five years earlier than expected. 
During the 1950s, strict technology denial gave way to nuclear cooperation and tech¬ 
nology control. President Eisenhower initiated the Atoms for Peace Program which 
pledged the US to share its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This sharing was 
to be facilitated through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
which would promote and monitor the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The Atoms 
for Peace program was the genesis for what was later to be called the "nuclear bargain."4 
The US would share its technology with other countnes in return for commitments not to 
build nuclear weapons. These bilateral agreements allowed the US to both maintain its 
dominance over nuclear technology and increase its influence overseas with the many 
states eager to explore this new energy source. It was also during this penod that the 
AEA was rewritten to allow industry participation in the nuclear field. This was seen as 
economically beneficial and by the end of the 1960s the US was supplying 90 percent of 
the world reactor market.5 
2Clausen, Nonproliferation, 16-22. 
3Ibid., 7. 
4Ibid., 28. 
5Ibid., 41. 
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Yet the US was slowly beginning to realize the potential for nuclear proliferation 
inherent in the nuclear bargain. India provided the first example of a weapons program 
developed from peaceful technology provided by the US.b In 1963, India purchased two 
power reactors from the US. They were the first to be exported to the developing world. 
It was from these two reactors in Tarapur that India produced the plutonium for its 
weapons program and the nuclear devices which were tested in 1974 and 1998. In 
addition, China's first nuclear test in 1964 raised concern in Washington that nuclear 
weapons had moved beyond the industrialized world. That same year the US began 
pursuing a comprehensive international ban on the spread of nuclear weapons which 
culminated in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
The NPT which entered into force on 5 March 1970 is the most comprehensive 
international nonproliferation arrangement with over 170 signatories. Under Articles I 
and II, parties to the treaty agree not to aid any nonnuclear state in acquiring nuclear 
weapons and nonnuclear states pledge not to receive nuclear devices or attempt to acquire 
them. Under Article III, all nuclear activities in nonnuclear states are subject to IAEA 
inspections. The IAEA's role was expanded from facilitating nuclear sharing to include 
verifying that countries receiving nuclear technology for peaceful purposes were not 
diverting it to produce weapons. These inspections act as a confidence building measure 
and also provide the basis upon which sanctions may be imposed for violations. In 
6Ibid., 102-103. 
7For text of the NPT and related documents see The United Nations and Nuclear Non- 
proliferation, The United Nations Blue Book Series, vol.3 (New York: Dept. Of Public 
Information United Nations, 1995). 
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return, the nuclear states, which are defined as the US, Russia (formerly the USSR), 
Great Britain, France, and China, pledge to share nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes and to work toward universal nuclear disarmament (Articles IV and VI.) 
Although many nonnuclear states participated in the debates over the treaty, the final 
document reflected the concerns and preferences of the nuclear powers and the US in 
particular. The US gave few concessions to the nonnuclear states in return for their 
pledges to forego nuclear weapons. The treaty does not specify a time period for 
disarmament to occur and Article IV does not create a legal obligation for nuclear states 
to cooperate with nonnuclear states. The US also refused to extend security guarantees to 
the signatories which would have pledged US support had they been attacked with 
nuclear weapons. Additionally, the nuclear weapons states did not have to submit to 
IAEA inspections. Many states did, and still do, denounce the treaty as discriminatory. 
The NPT and IAEA inspections form the backbone of the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime.8 A regime is defined as "an authoritative arrangement among international actors 
that facilitates the accomplishment of specific goals through a process involving coordi¬ 
nation of expectations and modification of certain behavior patterns."9 The 
8There is an extensive literature on regime theory and formation which debates the 
existence and utility of international regimes. For further readings on the nonprolifera¬ 
tion regime and security regimes in general see Stephen D. Krasner, ed.. International 
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining the 
Non-Proliferation Regime," International Organisation 35 (Winter 1981): 15-38; Roger 
K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary 
International Relations Theory," International Organization 41(Spring 1987): 253-281; 
and, Michael Brzoska, "Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System a Regime? A Comment 
on Trevor McMorris Tate," Journal of Peace Research 29 (1992): 215-220. 
9Trevor McMorris Tate, "Regime-building in the Non-Proliferation System," Journal 
of Peace Research 27(1990): 402. 
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nonproliferation regime consists of the NPT, suppliers groups, and regional organizations 
whose goal is to slow and/or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by creating transpar¬ 
ency and confidence among states. The US helped create many of these treaties and 
arrangements. The domestic legislation and restrictions enacted by individual states also 
comprise part of the regime. 
Although the regime has become an important barrier to proliferation, it suffers from 
several weaknesses which compromise its effectiveness and call into question its utility. 
First, the regime relies mainly upon technology denial and control which is becoming 
less effective as nuclear technology diffuses. Second, IAEA inspections are conducted 
with notice and only on declared facilities. Although the revelations of Iraq's program 
have led to the adoption of more intrusive verification methods and special inspections, 
issues of sovereignty still limit its inspection abilities. Third, the discriminatory aspects 
of the regime have prejudiced support for it. The regime reflects the interest of the 
nuclear states by maintaining their monopoly over nuclear weapons while providing few 
assurances or benefits to the nonnuclear states. 
Renewed concern over proliferation arose during the mid-1970s in response to two 
emerging realities. First, the line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear technol¬ 
ogy was becoming more blurred as many states which had imported technology for 
peaceful purposes now had or were developing active nuclear programs. These states 
included India, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Iraq, and South Africa. In 
1974, India conducted what it referred to as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Second, 
Europe began competing in the nuclear reactor market. The first of these developments 
17 
called into question the adequacy of US nonproliferation policies. The second raised 
fears of further proliferation due to unregulated European competition for reactor sales. 
In response the US initiated the creation of the Zangger Committee which was to keep 
an up-to-date list of "trigger" materials and equipment that could be used to build 
weapons.10 The goal of the committee was to raise awareness among the supplier states 
of the potentials for technology misuse. The London Suppliers Group, later renamed the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), was also created at this time to regulate technology 
transfers." It urged the nuclear states to restrict the export of dual-use technologies and 
to insist on full-scope IAEA safeguards by any country importing nuclear technology.12 
Dual-use technologies are those which have both civilian and military applications such 
as supercomputers. 
Domestically the US chose to strengthen its export criteria. In June 1976, the 
Symington Amendment was passed which barred economic aid to states importing fuel 
ennchment technology not under full-scope IAEA safeguards.13 In 1978, the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) became law and mandated stricter export criteria, 
terminated US cooperation with countries pursuing a weapons program or failing to 
submit to inspections, and set new standards for granting consent for reprocessing nuclear 
10Tate, "Regime-building," 406. 
"Ibid. 
'
2Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 27. 
"Gerald C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," 
Foreign Affairs 68, no.3 (Summer 1989): 58. 
18 
fuel of American origin.14 Additionally, both Presidents Ford and Carter worked to 
remove the US's domestic nuclear program from dependence on plutomum which is 
considered more of a proliferation hazard than uranium.15 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the US also began a dialogue with the USSR on arms 
control. In 1963, they initiated restrictions on their own nuclear programs by concluding 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty.16 Later efforts included the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty 
(1972), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (1972), and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
(1974).' Although these treaties did not prevent nuclear build-ups by both states, they 
did lay a foundation for later treaties such as the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) 
and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which began to limit vertical proliferation 
and fulfill the disarmament pledge under the NPT. 
The Reagan and Bush administrations did not actively pursue nonproliferation. 
Export controls and policies remained in effect and were enhanced by the passage of the 
Solarz Amendment which banned aid to countries violating US export laws to acquire 
nuclear weapons.18 Yet both administrations promoted nuclear exports and stressed the 
need for cooperation on nuclear issues. The strategic needs of the Cold War outweighed 
nonproliferation concerns and nuclear cooperation with states considered to be low 
14Gerald M. Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy: Global Regimes and Regional 
Realities," Contemporary Security Policy 15, no.3(December 1994): 135. 
15Clausen, Nonproliferation, 135. 
16Bee, Nuclear Proliferation, 26. 
17Ibid. 
18Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 136. 
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proliferation risks was advocated.19 These states were either allies or client states. States 
considered to be high proliferation risks were still routinely denied exports. These states 
were usually either hostile toward or unneeded by the US. The country-by-country 
approach taken under Presidents Reagan and Bush was a continuation of the tendency to 
selectively apply nonproliferation policies to serve the national interest.20 
Trends and Biases in US Policy 
The history of US nuclear nonproliferation policy from 1945-1989 reveals several 
trends which reflect the biases and inconsistencies within US policy. These trends reflect 
the tension between maintaining a consistent nonproliferation policy and calculating the 
costs to other interests. 
The first trend is a continuing conflict between reliance on nuclear weapons and 
efforts to deny them to other countries.21 Despite the US's attempts to downplay the 
utility of nuclear weapons and promote the benefits of nuclear restraint, its own depen¬ 
dence on them countered this proposition. When the US decided to initiate a nuclear 
build-up to counter the perceived Soviet threat, it enshrined the atomic bomb as the 
ultimate weapon. Nuclear weapons became not only the ultimate security guarantor, but 
l9Clausen, Nonproliferation, 160. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid., xiii. 
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the key to international status and prestige. They were a symbol of a modem state.22 The 
fact that all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are nuclear 
powers is not lost on aspiring regional hegemons. 
The second trend present in US nonproliferation policy has been the tension between 
limiting the burden of overseas commitments while still addressing the security concerns 
of potential nuclear powers.23 Throughout the Cold War period the US provided 
extended deterrence to its allies to prevent them from seeking independent nuclear arse¬ 
nals. Extended deterrence played a major role in the decisions of Japan and Germany not 
to acquire nuclear weapons even though they were technically capable.24 Likewise, US 
security assurances contributed to the decisions of South Korea and Taiwan to abandon 
their nuclear programs.25 In contrast, uncertainty over the US's commitment to Europe 
prompted France to develop an independent nuclear arsenal during the 1950s.26 
The third pattern in US nonproliferation policy has been its reluctance to exert 
pressure against the nuclear programs and industries of close allies and client states.27 
"Scott D. Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Current History 96, no.609 
(April 1997): 154. 
23Clausen, Nonproliferation, xiii. 
240ther factors also contributed to the decisions of Germany and Japan such as the 
development of anti-military political cultures after World War II. See Thomas U. 
Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in The Culture 
of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317-356. 
25The US also exerted economic pressure against Taiwan and South Korea to induce 
their compliance. 
26Clausen, Nonproliferation, 59-60. 
27rbid., xiii. 
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Israel and Pakistan are two examples of this reluctance. Although the US attempted to 
restrain its nuclear program in the early stages, by 1968 the US Central Intelligence 
Agency was aware that Israel possessed nuclear weapons.28 Despite its refusal to join the 
NPT or submit to IAEA inspections, the US maintained close ties with Israel throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s and continued its economic and military aid in violation of US 
domestic legislation. 
In 1978, aid to Pakistan was withdrawn due to its nuclear program. However, in 1979 
after the USSR invaded Afghanistan, aid was reinstated so that the US could continue to 
send aid to a country in the forefront of containing Soviet aggression.29 Pakistan was not 
bound by the Symington Amendment nor by the Solarz Amendment. In 1985, Congress 
passed the Pressler Amendment which required the President to certify every year that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device as a condition on foreign aid. Presidents 
Reagan and Bush continued this certification until 1990 despite knowledge of Pakistan's 
nuclear program.30 
Besides ignoring the nuclear programs of allies and clients, the US has also been 
unwilling to apply sanctions for nonproliferation policy violations. In a study of sanc¬ 
tions from 1968-1991 the US never sanctioned a member the Liberal Security Commu¬ 
nity.31 Membership in the LSC is defined as "a group of established liberal democracies 
28Seymour M. Hersch, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991). 241. 
29Smith and Cobban, "A Blind Eye," 58. 
30Ibid. 
31Chafetz, "Political Psychology." 
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that self-consciously identify their security interests collectively on the basis of shared 
core values and a history of cooperation."33 States not included in the LSC were rou¬ 
tinely sanctioned. For instance, South Africa was sanctioned several times between 1975 
and 1991 for failing to adhere to nuclear safeguards and attempting to develop missiles. 
France, Switzerland, and Israel, all of whom contributed to the South African program, 
were not sanctioned. 
This brief history of US nonproliferation policy from 1945 through the late 1980s has 
shown that although the US accepted the idea of global nonproliferation standards, it 
continued to apply its policies selectively. The prevailing explanations for these biases 
were the Cold War and the need to defend the national interest. The strategic need to 
contain the USSR justified subordinating nonproliferation goals and continuing the build¬ 
up of the US's nuclear arsenal. It was used to justify continued aid to allies and client 
states such as Pakistan and Israel and to justify overlooking their violations of the inter¬ 
national nonproliferation regime. When the US did support nonproliferation efforts 
among these states, it was not a priority and only occurred when it was not politically 
costly. 
Although the Cold War did influence the discriminatory standards in US policy, it is 
inadequate in two ways. First, it is almost tautological to say that the US pursued its best 
interests without saying exactly what those interests are. If interest is defined as counter¬ 
ing the USSR, then it would be expected that every act of discrimination was linked to a 
33Ibid., 745. States considered to be members of the Liberal Security Community are 
listed in Appendix 1. 
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Cold War interest. Second, although the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR is 
over, the same patterns still persist in US policy. 
CHAPTER 3 
US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
Changes in the International System 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in December 1989 seemed to symbolize the end of the 
Cold War although the process had been in motion for years. Throughout the early 
1990s, as dramatic changes were taking place in superpower relations, many dramatic 
occurrences were also taking place with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. Several states 
renounced their nuclear ambitions, the Iraqi nuclear program was discovered, North 
Korea threatened withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and the NPT 
review conference was scheduled for 1995. It was also during this period that the US 
found itself for the first time in fifty years without the Soviet Union as a guiding principle 
behind its military build-up, strategic alliances, and foreign policy decisions. All of these 
events served to renew attention to proliferation issues within the US. 
In the fifty years since the bomb was developed, the international environment and 
nonproliferation issues have changed dramatically. Five nations are declared nuclear 
powers, three others, India, Pakistan and Israel, have nuclear capability, and many others 
have attempted to develop these weapons. Despite the nonproliferation regime, suppliers 
groups, and export controls, the spread of nuclear technology and the globalization of the 
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arms industry has made nuclear weaponry more accessible than ever before.1 The main 
lesson learned from the Iraqi program is that creating a nuclear device is now possible 
through more technologies and more states than ever before.2 For a determined prolifer- 
ator, current export controls can only slow the process, not prevent it.3 
The spread and diversity of nuclear technologies has complicated the task of defining 
proliferation and determining which states are proliferating. As already mentioned 
nuclear proliferation can basically be defined as the creation or possession of a nuclear 
device by any state. Beyond this basic definition, problems arise when trying to deter¬ 
mine what level of development constitutes proliferation. Does it mean having a fully 
assembled nuclear device and the ability to launch it or has proliferation occurred when a 
state possesses the technical capability to build a device? The types of technology that 
could indicate a nuclear weapons program have expanded enormously and most have 
dual-use capability. Further, missile technology is increasingly defined as a form of 
proliferation; however, many states have interests in this technology for satellite pro¬ 
grams, not weapon delivery systems. These gray areas in the definition of proliferation 
'Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Prolifera¬ 
tion Challenge," International Security 19, no.2 (Fall 1994): 170-198. 
2Peter A. Zimmerman, "Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough," Orbis 38 
(Winter 1994): 67-82; Peter A. Zimmerman, "Technical Barriers to Nuclear Prolifera¬ 
tion," Security Studies 2 (1993): 345-356; William C. Potter, "The New Nuclear 
Suppliers," Orbis 36 (Spring 1992): 199-210; and, George Perkovich, "The Plutonium 
Genie," Foreign Affairs 72, no.3 (Summer 1993): 153-165. 
3Mark D. Mandeles, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Implications for the U.S. of 
Third World Nuclear Weapon and Ballistic Missile Proliferation," Security Studies 1 
(Winter 1991): 240; and, Paul L. Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export 
Controls: Why Bother?" Orbis 36 (Spring 1992): 167-180. 
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have complicated the task of determining which states are proliferation risks and created 
a situation in which proliferation is often determined by perception. In other words, a 
state depends as much upon its perception of another state's intentions to determine if it is 
a proliferation risk as upon the actual material capability of the state. 
Patterns of Proliferation 
When the Cold War ended, many scholars began predicting how systemic changes in 
the international system would affect proliferation. One view was that proliferation 
would become more likely because a multipolar world created more uncertainty which 
would lead states to look to their own secunty.4 Others argued that proliferation would 
be less likely because of reduced security threats and reductions in the arsenals of the 
nuclear states.5 The growing historical trends toward free market economies and demo¬ 
cratization were also seen to promote nonproliferation.6 Many states pursuing economic 
liberalization would embrace nonproliferation standards in order to gain access to inter¬ 
national capital.7 While this seems to have occurred in Brazil and Argentina, India and 
4Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear 
Weapons Proliferation," in "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread 
(and What Results)," eds. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, Security Studies, 
special issue, 2 no. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 37-78. 
5Lawrence Freedman, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons," Survival 
36, no.4 (Winter 1994): 35-36. 
6Leonard S. Spector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," Sun'ival 37, no.l (Spring 1995): 76. 
7Etel Solingen, "The New Multilateralism and Nonproliferation: Bringing in Domestic 
Politics," Global Governance 1 (1995): 210; and, Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy 
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Pakistan have moved toward more open nuclear stances with their nuclear tests in 1998 
and have endangered their access to foreign aid and World Bank loans. Another theory 
suggests that proliferation would decrease among the core states (liberal/democratic 
states) because they do not perceive each other as military threats and increase among the 
peripheral states because of continued security concerns and ambitions.8 
Looking at the pattern of proliferation since 1990, an asymmetrical pattern has 
emerged with many states moving toward a nonnuclear position while others have con¬ 
tinued or accelerated their nuclear programs. South Africa voluntarily dismantled its 
nuclear weapons program, joined the NPT and submitted to IAEA inspections in 1991.' 
As liberal reforms have taken place, Brazil and Argentina both apparently have aban¬ 
doned their nuclear programs, placed all their nuclear facilities under bilateral and IAEA 
inspections, and are working on confidence building measures.10 The nuclear states 
which were created when the USSR disintegrated, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all 
chose to return their nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as nonnuclear weapons 
states." In addition, France and China both signed the NPT in 1992. 
of Nuclear Restraint," International Security 19, no.2 (Fall 1994): 126-169. 
8Glenn Chafetz, "The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An 
Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective," in "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear 
Weapons Spread (and What Results)," eds. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, 
Security Studies, special issue, 2, no.3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 127-158. 
9See Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 7-43. 
10Ibid., 45-88. 
"Ibid., 89-182. 
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On the other hand, many states maintained nuclear ambitions. Several states such as 
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea continued to affirm their intentions to develop 
nuclear weapons. Iraq's program, discovered after the Persian Gulf War, was found to be 
far more advanced than previously suspected. The seriousness of North Korea's program 
sparked a crisis in 1993 when it threatened to withdraw from the NPT over IAEA inspec¬ 
tions.12 Another set of states, India, Pakistan and Israel have continued to remain outside 
the NPT and to advance their programs. In light of the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 
by India and Pakistan, these states may be moving towards an arms race in South Asia. 
Nonproliferation Policy Under Presidents Bush and Clinton 
In some ways the Bush and Clinton administrations did not deviate from the nonpro¬ 
liferation policies of previous administrations. Both worked to promote nonproliferation 
among all states by strengthening existing nonproliferation agreements. The US was 
instrumental in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and supported 
efforts to expand the inspection authority of the IAEA after evidence of Iraq's evasion 
was discovered. In 1994, the US proposed the Fissile Material Cut-Off which would 
prohibit the further production of fissile material, uranium and plutonium.13 Several 
initiatives to strengthen export controls have been proposed such as the Wassenaar 
12Ibid., 247. 
l3Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, and Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endow¬ 
ment for International Peace, 1995), 98. 
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Arrangement and the New Forum which would be a successor to the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM.)14 These new arrangements would 
redirect export controls from an East-West focus to a global one. The US also supported 
the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to expand its export controls to cover dual- 
use items which effectively precluded nuclear commerce with India, Israel, and 
Pakistan.15 
Progress was made on arms control agreements with the signing of START I in July 
1991 and START II in January of 1993 which reduced the US's nuclear arsenal and 
helped to legitimize its nonproliferation goals. It has also worked on the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would prohibit all nuclear testing. In line with support¬ 
ing the CTBT, in 1994 the US Congress passes the Glenn Amendment which would 
impose sanctions against any state conducting a nuclear test. These sanctions could 
include the termination of economic and military aid as well as financial assistance from 
international sources such as the World Bank. 
In many ways, the end of the Cold War reduced the US's reasons for tolerating 
proliferation. No longer did the nuclear programs of clients need to be ignored in order 
l4Lvnne E. Davis, "The Wassenaar Arrangement," (address at the Carnegie Endow¬ 
ment for International Peace, Washington DC, 23 January 1996) US Department of State 
Dispatch 7, no.5 (29 January 1996): 19-21, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD- 
Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996); and, 
Thomas E. McNamara, "1995 Arms Control Accomplishments and Replacing COCOM," 
(statement before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the 
Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 21 September 
1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.42 (16 October 1995): 752-754, reproduced 
in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of 
Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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to maintain their friendship. The resources which had been devoted to the Cold War 
were now available for other goals such as nonproliferation. Nonprohferation became 
one of the US's main foreign policy goals and the Clinton administration called it the 
greatest danger to US and international security in the post-Cold War period. The com¬ 
mitment to preventing proliferation was more than rhetorical as indicated by the in¬ 
creased resources devoted to it and the creation of the Nonproliferation Center which is 
designed to coordinate the government's intelligence efforts on proliferation issues.16 
Yet instead of shifting to more universal standards, US policy seemed to become even 
more polarized. With the nuclear renunciations of several midlevel proliferators such as 
Brazil and Argentina, the disparity between the policies enacted against the remaining 
states was much more obvious. Among most states, including the advanced programs of 
states such as India and Israel, US policy continued to use the international regime, diplo¬ 
macy and incentives, and sanctions, when necessary to try and move these states toward a 
nonnuclear stance. Among the rogue states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya, 
US policy moved toward enacting broad, indefinite sanctions and threatening military 
action to halt their nuclear programs. 
US Policy and Non-Rogue States 
Among states not defined as rogues, nonproliferation strategy in the 1990s has been 
one of diplomatic and political pressure, economic incentives, and sanctions when 
16Henry Sokolski, "Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence," Orbis 38 (Spring 1994): 
255. 
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necessary. There was more emphasis on economic assistance as a tool than ever before 
and less emphasis on technology denial. The US recognized the security and other con¬ 
cerns behind the nuclear programs of these states and tried to develop strategies to meet 
them. 
One indication of these changes was a new willingness to consider regional arms 
control arrangements. In a reversal of previous policy, the US lent its support to the 
creation of several nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) in Africa and the South Pacific 
and has shown interest in a Middle East NWFZ proposed by Egypt.1 Previous adminis¬ 
trations felt regional arrangements undermined the authority of the NPT and international 
regime. Although support for universal arrangements such as the NPT continue to be the 
preferred policy, the acceptance of regional arrangements indicates its recognition of the 
need to be flexible with specific regional tensions and issues. 
In South Asia, the US began to move from preventing proliferation to encouraging 
regional nuclear nonproliferation initiatives as mandated by the 1992 amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act.18 This initiative requires the President to submit reports twice 
yearly on the ballistic and nuclear capabilities of India, Pakistan, and China, but does not 
impose sanctions of any kind. Instead of rolling-back the nuclear programs of India and 
Pakistan, the US encouraged confidence building measures and acceptance of IAEA 
inspections on all nuclear facilities.19 The US also proposed five-way talks between 
17Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 143. 
18Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 98. 
l9Ibid., 90. 
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itself, India, Pakistan, China and the Russia as a way to deal with the tensions contrib¬ 
uting to proliferation in the region.20 Even after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan 
and the imposition of sanctions, the US continued to stress the need to deal with the 
underlying tensions driving the nuclear programs of these states. 
Israel has received little pressure from the US to abandon its nuclear program, but 
was persuaded by the US in 1991 to abide by the export controls of the Missile Technol¬ 
ogy Control Regime (MTCR).2' Israel's participation in the MTCR, however, only limits 
its aid to other countries and does not affect its own missile program. 
A new aspect of nonproliferation policy was the use of "dollar diplomacy" to induce 
states to renounce their nuclear weapons.22 Some policymakers felt that economic incen¬ 
tives would only encourage more proliferation, but others saw it as a necessary conces¬ 
sion to meet the concerns of these states. In 1991 Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear 
Threat Reduction Act (Nunn-Lugar) which pledged $400 million to assist in safely dis¬ 
mantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union (FSU).23 Related to this was the 
creation of the International Science and Technology Center which provides employment 
to scientists in the FSU so that their knowledge and expertise would not be sold on the 
20Ibid., 98. 
21
 Steinberg, "US Non-Proliferation Policy," 137. The MTCR is designed to limit 
transfers of technology that could be used to create ballistic missiles for the delivery of 
nuclear weapons. 
22Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 326-328. 
23
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international market.*4 In addition to the original S400 million pledged, the US pledged 
to Belarus an additional $65 million after it ratified START I and the NPT.25 Extensive 
negotiations yielded the "Trilateral Statement" between the US, Russia, and Ukraine. 
Ukraine agreed to yield all nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia and in return it received 
political, economic, and security benefits."6 Security guarantees by the US were indis¬ 
pensable to gaining this agreement. The US also promised an additional $200 million in 
assistance to Ukraine in exchange for signing this agreement.2 
The biggest economic incentive given to a state in exchange for pledges to cap its 
nuclear program was to North Korea. Under the Agreed Framework, a multilateral 
consortium—the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—was to be devel¬ 
oped in order to supply North Korea with two light-water reactors.28 This type of reactor 
produces very little plutonium and thus is considered proliferation-resistant. The esti¬ 
mated cost on these reactors is $4 billion. The US contribution would be $20 to $30 
million a year until the reactors were operating.29 
Export controls, long considered to be one of the key aspects of preventing prolifera¬ 
tion, continued to be laxly enforced among select states.30 In 1993 and 1994 steps were 
24Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 29. 
25Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 150-152. 
26Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 28. 
27Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 153. 
28Ibid., 276-280. 
29Ibid., 276-277. 
30Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks," 169. 
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taken to ease export restrictions for many dual-use items such as supercomputers and 
micro-electronics.31 The easing of export controls for most states was an indication of the 
US's new willingness to utilize diplomacy than more restrictions and sanctions. 
When sanctions were applied to non-rogue states, they were applied in response to a 
specific violation and were removed once the violation was rectified. For example, 
sanctions were imposed on Russia in May 1992 for sales to India in violation of the 
MTCR.32 Once the sales were halted, the sanctions were lifted with no further repercus¬ 
sions. In October 1990, all economic and military assistance to Pakistan was terminated 
when President Bush was unable to certify to Congress that it did not possess a nuclear 
device under the Pressler Amendment.33 Yet tensions over these sanctions did not pre¬ 
clude US trade with Pakistan nor did they prevent the US from pursuing other avenues of 
pressure. Likewise, the sanctions imposed upon India and Pakistan for their 1998 nuclear 
tests can be removed when they sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and possibly 
the Nonproliferation Treaty. 
US Policy and the Rogue States 
During the Clinton administration, the rogue image became more concrete and inte¬ 
grated into official rhetoric. US policy toward the rogue states took two forms: increased 
31Frank J. Gaffhey Jr., "Shortsighted U.S. Policies Mean Nuclear Proliferation," 
Insight 10, no. 29 (18 July 1994): 36. 
32Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 91. 
33Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 187. 
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sanctions and potential military action. There was decreased emphasis on diplomacy and 
negotiation with these states. 
The US's focus upon these states began in the late 1980s as the Soviet threat dimin¬ 
ished. The Pentagon found itself without a guiding principle or rationale for its defense 
budget. The search for a new enemy led military planners to construct what is now- 
known as the "Rogue Doctrine."34 This doctrine, which began to form in the Bush 
administration, substituted the threat of Third World proliferation for the Soviet threat. 
While this doctrine at first focused upon the military capabilities of states, this presented 
two problems for military planners. First, even the best armed Third World nation did 
not present enough of a threat to justify the budget enjoyed during the Cold War/5 This 
eventually led to the conclusion that the military needed to be able to fight two wars 
simultaneously. It also led military planners to focus upon the most potentially threaten¬ 
ing aspect of these states, their quest for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, 
by focusing upon potential military and WMD threats from the Third World, many states 
which were current allies of the US had to be included on the list of potential rogues. 
This led military planners to focus upon the political character of these states with 
emphasis upon those least friendly with the US.36 
By 1990 a rogue state could be classified as "a hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third 
World state with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities...bent on sabotaging 
34Klare, Rogue States, 22. 
35Ibid., 28. 
36Ibid., 24-25. 
35 
the prevailing world order. Such regimes were said to harbor aggressive intentions vis-a- 
vis their less powerful neighbors, to oppose the 'spread of democracy,' and to be guilty of 
circumventing international norms against nuclear and chemical proliferation."3. The 
rogue image drew heavily from the literature on international terrorism which helped to 
link these two images and reinforce the danger of these states.38 When Iraq invaded 
Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Rogue Doctrine was given a face for its enemy. Iraq came 
to symbolize the evil and aggressive nature of states which violated international norms 
and developed weapons of mass destruction.39 
The creation of the rogue image was the result of several converging factors: renewed 
interest in nonproliferation, domestic politics, and the actions of the rogue states them¬ 
selves. As already discussed, several international events dramatized proliferation con¬ 
cerns within the US. Domestically, the Defense Department, national laboratones, and 
ethnic lobbies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) all favored 
targeting these states as potential military threats because it furthered their own inter¬ 
ests.40 The Defense Department could continue to justify its defense budget.41 Several 
37Ibid., 26. 
38Ibid., 26-27. For literature on terrorism see Noam Chomsky The Cult of Terrorism 
(Boston: South End Press, 1988); and, Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State 
2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986.) 
39Ibid., 37. 
40AIPAC is a powerful interest group of American Jewish community which lobbies 
for pro-Israeli policies and is often suspected of controlling America's Middle East 
Policy. See Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.) 
41Klare, Rogue States, 21. 
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national laboratories which were feeling cut-backs in the post-Cold War penod now had 
a new goal—to help develop technology for detecting, monitoring, and fighting prolifera¬ 
tion.42 Although business and industry generally opposed the targeting and subsequent 
sanctions placed on the rogue states, other interest groups such as AIPAC were very 
influential in wanting to maintain the image of states such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria as 
military threats.43 In this way, military and foreign aid to Israel would remain a priority. 
Yet it was also the actions of these states which classified them as rogues. All of these 
states have engaged in behavior and rhetoric considered unacceptable by the majority of 
the international community, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism, 
repression, and the use of chemical weapons. All have violated, or are suspected of 
violating, the international norm against acquiring nuclear weapons and their obligations 
under the NPT to which they are signatones. In addition, all have at some point espoused 
anti-Western or anti-American sentiments, opposed US interests, and/or been engaged in 
conflicts with the US. All of these factors made them likely candidates for classification 
as rogues. 
The rogue states are routinely denied nuclear exports and placed under broad sanc¬ 
tions. Iran and Iraq are under the most stringent export controls as mandated by the Iran- 
Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992.44 In 1994, Congress expanded the term terrorism to 
42Christopher Anderson, "Nonproliferation Boom Gives a Lift to the National Labs," 
Science 263 (4 February 1994): 627-629. 
43Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998), 60-63. 
■"Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, "Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors," Foreign 
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include efforts by any nonnuclear state, group or individual to acquire or create nuclear 
explosives.45 Therefore, many of the restrictions and sanctions which were created to 
deal with terrorism were now applicable to the nuclear programs of the rogue states, all of 
which are classified as state sponsors of terrorism. 
Sanctions placed on these states are in response to a wide vanety of behaviors inclu¬ 
ding their WMD programs. Since sanctions are not just in response to nuclear violations 
it is difficult to have sanctions removed because a list of grievances must be rectified, not 
just the nuclear violation. In 1992, the UN Security Council, with the support of the US, 
declared proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security which opened the 
way for using multilateral sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.46 
The US also strengthened sanctions against individuals, states and companies which 
contribute to the nuclear programs of the rogue states. The Foreign Relations Authoriza¬ 
tion Act of 1994 imposes sanctions on individuals which contribute to proliferation 
through export activities.4' The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
prohibits assistance to terrorist states by US firms or individuals.48 The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act applies this law to any person, foreign or US, trading or investing with 
Libya or Iran.49 
45Tanter, Rogue Regimes, x. 
46Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old 
Bottles," The Washington Quarterly 18, no.2 (Spring 1995): 146. 
47Tanter, Rogue Regimes, 285. 
48Ibid., 80. 
49Ibid. 
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The Persian Gulf War and the subsequent revelations of Iraq's nuclear program laid 
the groundwork for more active military involvement in nonproliferation. The military 
action against Iraq provided the prototype of a rogue state for defense planners. During 
the war, sites which were known to be involved in nuclear and chemical weapons design 
were targeted in an effort to destroy Iraq's capabilities.50 After the war, the US supported 
all UN resolutions mandating the destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities and has been 
willing to threaten military action in order to force Hussein to allow inspectors access to 
all suspected sites. 
Iraq's program highlighted the need to be able to deal with a successful proliferator 
and helped shift the focus of nonproliferation from preventing to fighting it.31 The 
Pentagon is now challenging the traditional centers of nonproliferation activity, the State 
Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), whose focus has 
been on diplomacy, exports and sanctions.52 In 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled 
its first major defense initiative, the Defense Counter Proliferation Initiative. The core of 
this initiative was to apply military resources and planning to address the threats posed by 
emerging WMD capabilities around the globe.53 The exact meaning of counterprolifer- 
ation has not been ascertained and has changed over several years. The Pentagon has 
argued that this initiative is to supplement, not replace diplomatic efforts to prevent 
50Klare, Rogue States, 57. 
5ISpector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," 66. 
52Ibid., 79. 
"Muller and Reiss, "Counterproliferation," 143. 
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proliferation; however, the potential for pre-emptive military strikes has alarmed many 
within the US and abroad that the US may be willing to unilaterally use force to prevent 
the development of WMD by certain states.54 This has led the Pentagon to focus on the 
defensive aspects of the program while admitting that it is applicable to offensive strikes. 
The US also considered military strikes an option for ending North Korea's nuclear 
program. During the crisis over inspections, the US prepared plans for a possible cruise 
missile attack on the Yongbyon nuclear complex.55 This option was never publicly 
advocated. 
Another issue which raised questions about the role of the military in nonproliferation 
policy was the White House statement in 1996 that the US would retain its options to use 
nuclear weapons if attacked by a state, party to a nuclear weapons free zone or the NPT, 
that employed weapons of mass destruction.56 The US has maintained its right to use 
nuclear weapons in self-defense against a nuclear attack. The 1996 statement, however, 
expanded this option to include chemical and biological weapons. This opens the pos¬ 
sibility that the US would allow nuclear retaliation against a state such as Libya if it used 
chemical weapons. Whether or not this scenario is likely, the statement symbolically 
shows the US's willingness to use whatever means it deems necessary in the fight against 
WMD. 
54Ibid., 146. 
55Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 258-259. 
56George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use 
Pledges?" Arms Control Today 26, no.4 (May 1996): 7. 
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As can be seen from an overview of US policy toward the rogue states, it is difficult to 
separate nonproliferation policy from other issues. Policy is affected by the actions of 
these states, but it is also affected by their history of interaction, political differences, and 
other behaviors by these states. Several issues of concern coincide with these states. For 
instance, all have been defined as state supporters of terrorism and cited for human rights 
abuses. They also all espouse radical ideologies with anti-Western or anti-American 
elements.57 This runs counter to another high priority on the foreign policy agenda within 
the Clinton administration, the doctrine of "democratic enlargement."58 One of the main 
arguments for containing these states and preventing them from acquiring WMD is the 
tear that they would threaten the democratic order.59 Separating policies designed to 
counter the proliferation activities of these states from policies designed to alter their 
government, end their support for terrorism and human rights abuses is almost impossible 
because all of these elements are seen as part of their rogue character. 
As an example of the nonspecific nature of US policy, both Iraq and Iran are currently 
under the broad policy of "dual containment."<>l, This policy seeks to contain the activi¬ 
ties of both states at the same time without favoring one state to balance the other. In 
"Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," Foreign Affairs 74, no.2 
(March/April 1995): 34. 
"Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy 
106 (Spring 1997): 116. 
"Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73, no.2 (March/ 
April 1994): 45. 
60F. Gregory Cause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs 73, no.2 
(March/April 1994): 56-58. 
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Iraq, it is hoped that this policy will bring about a regime change. In Iran it is meant to 
contain several activities deemed unacceptable by the US. These include support for 
international terrorism, opposition to the peace process, efforts to subvert other Arab 
governments, a military build-up and efforts to acquire WMD. This broad policy makes 
it almost impossible to separate the various issues of concern. 
US Policy in Comparison 
The US has focused its nonproliferation efforts upon the states it considers rogues. 
The emphasis on sanctions and military planning to prevent proliferation among these 
states has been considered overly harsh, punitive, and counterproductive by some. While 
not denying that the actions of these states require action, current nonproliferation policy 
can be judged as harsh by making three comparisons: to past policy, to the policies of 
other Western nations, and to policies toward other states. 
First, as the history of US policy showed, technology denial and diplomatic efforts 
formed the basis of nonproliferation efforts for forty years. Not until the late 1980s did 
the military become involved in nonproliferation. Threats of military action, the bomb¬ 
ing of Iraq's nuclear facilities during the Gulf War and military planning represent a new 
aspect of policy. 
Second, other Western nations do not concur with the US policy of sanctions or the 
designation of certain states as rogues. They fear that the US has allowed favoritism to 
color its choices and are concerned by the idea that it may unilaterally make itself judge. 
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jury and executioner over the nuclear programs of rogue states.61 Instead they see 
engagement with these states as the best way to foster change in their policies. They 
have refused to emulate the trade bans which the US has imposed upon Iran.62 Dissent is 
also gathering over the continuation of sanctions on Iraq.63 While acknowledging these 
states as potential threats, they view them more as opportunities and feel that US policy 
magnifies the misbehavior of these states by over-emphasizing the threat and devoting 
excessive resources to combating it.64 
There is also a gap between US and IAEA assessments of threat from these states. In 
1994 the IAEA stated that it had found no signs of unpeaceful nuclear activity in Iran.65 
Yet the US maintained sanctions because of its belief that Iran has a hidden program. 
Similarly, the IAEA has declared that it believes Iraq's ability to manufacture WMD has 
been eliminated, but the US insists upon the continuation of sanctions.56 
Third, in comparison to other states, the US applies harsher sanctions to the rogues 
than other states. Although discriminatory standards have always been a part of US 
policy, the differences in approaches have rarely been as stark. This chapter has outlined 
the major differences in policy between the rogue states and others. While the rogue 
61Muller and Reiss, "Counterproliferation," 146-147. 
62Paul F. Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues in Global Perspective," Middle East 
Policy 4, no. 1-2 (September 1995): 200. 
63Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs 74, no.l 
(January/February 1995): 70. 
64Tanter, Rogue Regimes, 21. 
65Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 199. 
66Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy," 66. 
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states are subject to sanctions and possibly military action, the US has preferred diplo¬ 
macy and incentives among other states. 
The post-Cold War policies show a continued discrepancy of standards among states. 
Despite the rhetoric proclaiming proliferation to be the greatest threat to international 
peace and security, policy has remained ambivalent to the nuclear programs of several 
states, while reacting strongly to those of the rogue states. Why has the US continued to 
apply discriminatory standards? Policy is not based upon the material capabilities of the 
states. India and Pakistan have both advanced to the point of conducting nuclear tests. In 
light of the revelations of Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli defector, Israel is believed to pos¬ 
sess between fifty and two hundred nuclear devices.67 All these states have refused to 
join the NPT. In contrast, none of the rogue states has assembled, tested, or is yet able to 
create a nuclear device. Iraq is under international monitoring. Iran is believed to be five 
to eight years away from developing a nuclear device. Libya does not possess the infra¬ 
structure to build a nuclear weapon and attempts to purchase one have been rebuffed. 
The extent of North Korea's program is uncertain and some believe it may have been able 
to create one or two nuclear devices although this has not been confirmed.68 Nor is 
policy based solely upon the breaking of international obligations. Each state which is 
proliferating has broken international norms, including many Western nations which have 
contributed to the nuclear programs of other states. 
67Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 135. 
68Ibid., 103. 
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The answer seems to lie in how the US perceives threat. Threat perception is tied to 
how the US defines its interests and its relationships with other states. The US perceives 
the actions of the rogue states as more threatening to its interests than the nuclear pro¬ 
grams of other states. This leads to overestimations of threat and the implementation of 
harsh and often punitive policies. In the next section this theory will be developed to 
explain how and why the US perceives the actions of the rogue states differently from 
other nuclear proliferators and how this leads to overperceptions of threat. 
CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL IDENTITY, PERCEPTION, AND ATTRIBUTION BI AS 
Social identity theory offers an explanation for why the US applies discriminatory 
standards of nonproliferation among states. This theory is rooted in social psychology 
and suggests that the "constructed identities of states, governments, and other political 
actors" influence how they define their security interests and perceive threats.1 In 
contrast with realist and liberal theories that assume interests as given, this theory sees 
interests as something which the state must learn through its interactions with other states 
and actors in the international system.2 An examination of how identity shapes security 
interests and affects the perceptions of policymakers provides a better explanation for the 
bias within US nonproliferation policy than theories which focus upon material capabil¬ 
ity. 
Social identity theory has been used to explain or clarify several types of state 
behavior which have not been adequately explained by other theories such as the 
'Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. 
Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4. 
2Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, 
and Culture in National Security," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), 34. 
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democratic peace3 and how nationalism influences conflict.4 One study has found that by 
including identity protection as a goal of foreign policy, specific US foreign policy 
stances could be better predicted.5 Changes in the identity and core values of a state are 
also being used to predict changes in the general direction of foreign policy.6 In these 
studies, social identity theory provided a basis for determining what the national interests 
of a state were. This thesis builds upon a study which used social identity theory to 
explain the formation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and why discriminatory 
standards have been applied among its members. The study proposes the existence of a 
liberal security community (LSC) led by the US, and based upon a shared liberal- 
democratic identity. Members of this in-group discriminate in favor of their own group 
members even when it leads to less than optimal results.8 In support of this theory, 
sanctioning practices within the nonproliferation regime were examined and a discrimina¬ 
tory pattern was found in favor of the LSC members.9 This thesis adopts the same 
3Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Rethinking Democracy and 
International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," International Studies 
Quarterly 29 (1995): 51 1-533. 
4Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psycholog¬ 
ical Perspective," Mershon International Studies Review 38( 1994): 43-68. 
5William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional 
Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs," International Studies Quarterly 39( 1995): 
313-331. 
6Jack Citrin et al., "Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign 
Policy," International Studies Quarterly 38( 1994): 1-31. 
7Chafetz, "Political Psychology." 
8Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517. 
9Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 755. 
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premise that shared identities affect how decisionmakers perceive threat, but focuses 
more narrowly upon biases in US nonproliferation policy. 
Social Identity Theory 
Identity can be defined as the basic character of a state and is composed of factors 
which are intrinsic to the state and those which are relational.10 Intrinsic characteristics 
include type of government, culture, history, and other factors specific to the state. Rela¬ 
tional characteristics are those which are relative to other actors in the international sys¬ 
tem. For instance, a state is only sovereign in relation to other states. Through social 
interaction states also engender "values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes, 
stereotypes, and other cognitive and motivational phenomena."11 Thus both domestic and 
international politics determine the identity of a state. This identity, however, is neither 
unitary nor static. While there is usually a core of relatively stable identities, there may 
be may competing identities within a state with various levels of support and saliency. 
This allows for identities to change, although usually only very slowly or in response to 
social upheaval. 
Although identity theories begin at the individual level, it is possible to speak of the 
collective identities of states and governments because identity is in part socially derived. 
Psychoanalytic theory has suggested processes by which the individual's identity is 
10Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture," 33. 
"Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 747. 
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transferred to a national identity and the ways in which the two are linked and often rein¬ 
force each other.1" Some studies, such as Heradstveit's study of the Arab/Israeli conflict, 
have moved away from the individual level and used states or entire societies as the basic 
unit of identity.13 Yet the individual remains the source of identity even though that 
identity may be collective. Therefore, when speaking about the identity of the state or 
other political actor it must be remembered that it is only though the actions and percep¬ 
tions of individuals that the collective identity is constructed. 
Social identity theory suggests that states derive their identity in part from their group 
memberships.14 States seek to enhance and protect their identities by sharing them with 
other states possessing similar characteristics and interests. States need both allies and 
enemies is order to define and enhance their self-esteem.15 This is not to suuuest that OO 
states which identify with each other are identical or share all interests in common. It is 
better thought of as a continuum where the more areas of similarity that exist, the more 
likely that there will be a strong identification. The intensity of the identification also 
depends upon both the saliency of a particular identity and its centrality to the actor. 
12Mary Caputi, "National Identity in Contemporary Theory," Political Psychology 
17(1996): 683-694; and, Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty," 44- 
46. 
13Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1979). 
14Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 748. See also Tajfel, Human Groups; and, Henri 
Tajfel, ed. Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982.) 
l5Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental 
Approach," Political Psychology 6 (1985): 219-247. 
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Identifying with some states and not others leads to the formation of in-groups and 
out-groups.16 The in-group can be trusted because it is similar while out-groups are 
viewed with suspicion because they are different.17 By perceiving one's own group in 
positive terms, members enhance their own self worth. Members of the in-group are 
considered good, moral, as conforming to acceptable standards of behavior, and generally 
"better" than other groups. Out-group members are considered bad, immoral, weak and 
as engaging in unacceptable behavior. Classification as either part of an in-group or out- 
group is not always clearly defined but is dependent upon how strongly the states identify 
with each other. This process of in-group/out-group differentiation helps define the 
identity of the state and thus its interests.18 The need to enhance its identity leads group 
members to discriminate in favor of their in-group even when it leads to less than optimal 
results.19 
The in-group/out-group distinction forms an important basis for determining who is an 
enemy and who is ally and thus helps to define a state's security interests. "Identification 
with or against a group allows actors to make relatively quick and easy judgments, 
including predictions about who will be friendly and who will not in a given 
16David A. Wilder and Warren E. Cooper, "Categorization into Groups: Consequences 
for Social Perception and Attribution," in New Directions in Attribution Research vol.3, 
eds. John H. Harvey, William Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1981), 253-260. 
17Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517. 
,8Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical 
Reprise," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. 
Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 475. 
''Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517. 
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environment."20 In-group members, are perceived as allies on the basis of shared charac¬ 
teristics and common interests. Out-group members are perceived as enemies because 
they do not share the same values and thus are bad. This is not to suggest that other 
factors do not influence this determination. A history of conflict, competing interests, 
lack of economic or diplomatic ties all contnbute to the characterization of a state as an 
enemy; however these factors often reinforce or are a product of the in-group/out-group 
classification. 
For instance, the role of culture has independently been studied as a source of conflict. 
Predictions of future conflict based upon cultural factors recently received attention21 and 
research has shown support for the theory that culture influences threat perception.22 One 
theory argues that war is not due to the innate nature of man, but is a cultural phenome¬ 
non that depends upon a number of complex sociological and psychological conditions.23 
Social identity theory also sees culture as a factor which influences conflict because it is a 
component of identity. Those whose culture is familiar are perceived as part of the in- 
group while those who are dissimilar are viewed with suspicion. Thus the distinction 
between the role identity plays and other factors in influencing threat perception is not 
clear. They often reinforce each other and are not mutually exclusive. 
20Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 749. 
21Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no.3 
(Summer 1993): 22-49. 
22Valerie A. Sulfaro and Mark N. Crislip, "How Americans Perceive Foreign Policy 
Threats: A Magnitude Scaling Analysis," Political Psychology 18 (1997): 103-126. 
230fer Zur, "The Psychohistory of Warfare: The Co-Evolution of Culture, Psyche and 
Enemy," Journal of Peace Research 24, no.2 (1987): 127. 
Misperception and Attribution Bias 
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Images of the enemy or out-group are often subject to distortion and misperception. 
Image theory has explored the question of how the enemy is perceived.24 There are four 
basic elements which make up the image of the enemy.25 First, the enemy is often per¬ 
ceived to be the opposite, or the "mirror-image" of a state's perception of itself. What¬ 
ever characteristics a state finds positive about itself it finds lacking in the enemy. 
Second, contradicting images of the enemy can exist at the same time. A state may be 
perceived as both extremely dangerous and weak with no apparent conflict. Third, the 
image of the enemy is dynamic. An enemy today can easily become an ally tomorrow. 
Fourth, there is the need to de-humanize the enemy. This can be seen in the tendency to 
demonize the enemy. 
Theories on enemy images have benefitted from work on schemas. A schema is a 
cognitive tool which aids a person is sorting and classifying new information based on 
generic knowledge and previous experience.26 Certain images which are related tend to 
be invoked together. For instance, the knowledge that a state is a democracy may invoke 
24Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social 
Psychologist's Report," Journal of Social Issues 17(1961): 46-56; Charles E. Osgood, An 
Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962); Ralph 
K. White, Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars (New York: 
Doubleday, 1970); Richard D. Ashmore et al., "An Experimental Investigation of the 
Double Standard in the Perception of International Affairs," Political Behavior 1(1979): 
123-135; and, Zur, "Psychohistory." 
25Zur, "Psychohistory," 131. 
26Deborah Welch Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making," Political Psychology 15 (1994): 18-20. 
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images such as peaceful, ally, and liberal. Schemas can help to fill in gaps in knowledge. 
Thus, if a state is perceived to be an enemy, other characteristics associated with the 
enemy schema will be attributed to that state. 
Besides distorting the images of enemies and allies, the need to enhance its identity 
leads a state to discriminate in favor of its in-group. These in-group biases, which may 
be motivated or cognitive, affect how policymakers interpret the behavior of states and 
perceive and cope with threat.27 Motivated biases consist of failures to recognize, con¬ 
sider relevant, or act on information which is inconsistent with the need to perceive in- 
group members as good and out-group members as bad.28 For instance, subjects have 
been found not to recall information inconsistent with their conception of their own 
nations.29 Cognitive biases on the other hand arise from "the decision-makers' inherently 
limited capacity for perception, recall, and attribution of meaning."30 In essence these 
biases are the result of misperception. Several types of cognitive bias affect decision- 
makers such as attribution bias and the inability to empathize.31 
Misperception within the field of foreign policy has been found to occur in some pre¬ 
dictable patterns, one of which is attribution bias.32 This study plans to focus upon 
27Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754. 
2SIbid. 
29Matthew S. Hirshberg, "The Self-Perpetuating National Self-image: Cognitive 
Biases in Perceptions of International Interventions," Political Psychology 14 (1993): 77- 
98. 
30Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754. 
3lIbid., 755-758. 
32Jervis, Perception, 35-48. 
attribution biases which occur in response to the need to enhance identity. Just as with 
identity theory, studies of attribution bias begin at the individual level; however, resear¬ 
chers have noted that "the cognitive and motivational biases impairing rationality that 
have attracted attention are rooted not only in the information-processing proclivities of 
individuals but also in the operational codes, understandings, and worldviews shared by 
decision makers and diffused throughout society."33 This British school approach which 
focuses upon societal attributions has been used to study collectively held misperceptions 
and how patterns of misperception may vary across cultures.34 
In general, attribution theory refers to "an area of study in social psychology regarding 
the causal inferences people make about social behavior."35 Attribution bias says that a 
state will attribute motivations differently based upon whether a state is an enemy or ally. 
This fundamental attribution error overestimates dispositional factors and underestimates 
situational factors.36 Dispositional factors are those which are intrinsic to the state such 
33Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture," 49. 
34Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, "Attribution Theory and Arab Images 
of the Gulf War," Political Psychology 17(1996): 275; and Miles Hewstone, Causal 
Attribution: From Cognitive Processes to Collective Beliefs (London: Basil Blackwell, 
1989). Not all cultures misperceive in the same patterns. For criticism of Western bias 
see Joan G. Miller, "Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46 (1984): 961-978; and, Miles Hewstone 
and Colleen Ward, "Ethnocentricism and Causal Attribution in Southeast Asia," Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 48 (1985): 614-623. 
35Thomas M. Ostrom, "Attribution Theory: Whence and Whither?" in New Directions 
in Attribution Research vol. 3 eds. John H. Harvey, William Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981), 405. 
36Heradstveit and Bonham, "Attribution Theory," 274-275; and, Janice Gross Stein, 
"Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat," in Political Psychol¬ 
ogy: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Neil J. Kressel (New York: Paragon 
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as type of government and characteristics of the state such as neutral or fundamentalist. 
Regular patterns of behavior are also dispositional factors providing they are not in 
response to a sustained unusual event. Situational factors are unusual external events 
over which the state has little or no control. 
Later work on this theory found more support for it when evaluative aspects were 
taken into account.37 For instance, it was found that an enemy's negative behavior was 
attributed to internal factors, but that positive behavior was attributed to situational 
factors. Conversely, a state's own positive behavior was attributed to its internal charac¬ 
ter, while negative behavior was seen as induced by the situation. This self-serving bias 
results from the state's attempt to defend its identity and usually leads to an overestima- 
tion of threat from an enemy.38 
An important point needs to be made about misperception and identity. Cognitive 
processes and perception play a large role in defining the identities of states and in the 
creation of in-group biases; however, a state's perception of identity, both its own and 
others, does not necessarily reflect reality. A state may want to believe itself to be 
democratic, but this does not make it true. Yet a state will take action based upon its 
perception, not upon reality. Conversely, perceptions are not always wrong. While in- 
group biases make misperception more likely, they do not make it unavoidable or auto¬ 
matic. Sometimes a state perceives threat because there really is a threat; however, 
House, 1993), 376. 
37Heradstveit and Bonham, "Attribution Theory," 274. 
38Stein, "Building Politics," 376. 
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unless the state understands how it misperceives it cannot tell the difference between an 
imaginary and a real threat. 
US Identity and Perceptions 
It has been a source of debate as to what values or characteristics comprise the identity 
of the US in part because there are so many competing subcultures and identities within 
American political culture.39 Most studies on US identity or nationalism find that the 
values of economic and political liberalism are central to how the US defines and per¬ 
ceives itself.40 Basically liberalism can be defined as the belief that "legitimate political 
power arises only from the consent of the governed."41 This is extended to the economic 
sphere to mean acceptance of free market capitalism. 
In relation to US nonproliferation policy, social identity theory says that the US will 
be motivated to enhance its identity by discriminating in favor of its in-group or allies, 
and discriminating against its out-group or enemies.42 Thus the same behavior by an 
enemy and an ally will be perceived differently. 
39Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern 
and Process, 5th ed.(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 257. 
40Ibid., 160. 
41Ibid., 623. 
42A11 enemies must be out-group member, but not all out-group members will neces¬ 
sarily be enemies. 
56 
States which share a liberal, democratic identity with the US will be perceived as 
friendly, trustworthy, and complying with international norms. Violations of norms will 
be discounted, ignored, or attributed to forces beyond the control of the state and explan¬ 
ations will be accepted.43 Thus the nuclear program of an ally will be attributed to situa- 
tional factors and not to the character of the state. Since this behavior is seen as an 
aberration and not reflective of the true desires of the state, it is considered understand¬ 
able and thus less threatening. The US is able to empathize with this state because it 
perceives it as being forced to develop nuclear weapons by factors beyond its control. 
This is similar to the US's argument that it must maintain a nuclear arsenal to deter 
aggression, not because it is aggressive. 
Conversely, states with which the US does not identify itself will be "viewed more 
suspiciously and are often pejoratively classified as an out-group with a set of derogatory 
attributes that differentiate them from the community of democratic states."44 The 
nuclear program of a rogue state is attributed to the disposition of that state which the US 
sees in negative terms and in contrast to its own positive characteristics. Since this 
behavior is perceived as an innate desire of the state, it is perceived as more threatening. 
Perceptions of states which do not clearly fit into the in-group or out-group categories 
will be more ambiguous. 
The presence of attribution bias among US policymakers will be determined by a 
content analysis of official documents from the executive branch. These documents will 
43Chafetz, "Political Psychology," 754. 
""Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy," 517. 
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be examined in order to reveal whether the US attributes the motivations behind the 
nuclear programs of enemies and allies differently. 
CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Content Analysis 
Content analysis is defined as "a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context."1 There are many techniques available for conduct¬ 
ing content analysis such as frequency counts2 or thematic density3; however, there is no 
single correct way to do content analysis.4 The technique used should be dependent upon 
the nature of the study. While using a previously designed methodology provides the 
researcher with a proven method, it is possible and sometimes necessary to apply content 
analysis in new ways as long as it conforms to the criteria of replicability and validity.5 
Although content analysis is a relatively common technique, there are criticisms of its 
'Klaus Knppendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Beverly 
Hills, CA; Sage Publications, 1980), 21. 
2Krippendorff, Content Analysis, 100. 
3Ronald L. Hatzenbuehier and Robert L. Ivie, Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, 
Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic (Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 1983), 40-44. 
4Robert Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis, 2d ed. (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990), 12. 
5Ibid. 
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utility. Can intentions, motivations, or actual beliefs be inferred from what a person 
says? Do written statements really reflect policy or are they merely rhetoric or outright 
lies? Undoubtedly statements do not reflect a situation or belief with complete accuracy. 
While this may be more troubling for an analysis of an individual, it creates less prob¬ 
lems for a study using a social group as its unit of analysis. Since the purpose of this 
study is to study a phenomenon which exists socially, attribution bias, there must be 
some connection between it and the way in which it is expressed—language. 
Discussing the problems of content analysis leads to a similar problem with reliance 
upon official documents and statements. There are two problems, the use of rhetoric and, 
for lack of a better term, a political restraint, in the language of official documents. Rhe¬ 
toric can be basically defined as "the management of symbols in order to coordinate 
social action"6 and its presence is not a hindrance to this study. The nationally held 
beliefs and images of the enemy which are invoked by attribution bias are almost 
assuredly a part of political rhetoric. Rhetoric is often used to help create and sustain a 
nation's perception of its identity.7 
The second problem with reliance on official documents for content analysis is more 
problematic. Political restraint is being used to mean the act of refraining from saying 
what might be true, but which is imprudent to say. It is almost a political correctness. 
For instance, policymakers rarely refer to states specifically when discussing 
6Gerard A. Hauser, Introduction to Rhetorical Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 
1986), 2. 
7Murray Edelman, "Language, Myths and Rhetoric," Society 35, no.2 (January 1988): 
131-139; and, Nathan Light, "Pizza in 30 Minutes, or How to Order a War: A Study of 
the Political Institution of Time," Journal of American Culture 17 (Spring 1994): 5-10. 
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nonproliferation in universally applicable terms. This is because it is unwise to single out 
some states for criticism and not others when trying to promote universal standards. 
Similarly, Israel's nuclear program is rarely mentioned. This is not because it does not 
exist or they do not have views on it; however, to acknowledge it is to invite criticism 
and questions of discrimination. 
In this study, content analysis will be used to infer beliefs or assumptions made by the 
sender of the message. The sender of the message will not be the individual, but the 
policy making establishment of the United States government. In order to test the hypo¬ 
thesis that US policymakers are subject to attribution bias, a content analysis of official 
statements and documents emanating from the executive branch will be undertaken. The 
focus will be on the executive branch because it is primarily involved in the creation and 
implementation of nonproliferation policy.3 The purpose of this content analysis is to 
infer from these documents whether the US exhibits attribution bias and associates the 
nuclear programs of enemy states with their character which is perceived in negative 
terms. 
Research Design 
A post-1990 time frame was chosen because nonproliferation has become a more 
prominent foreign policy goal since the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War. 
8Walton L. Brown, "Presidential Leadership and US Nonproliferation Policy," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 24(Summer 1994): 563-575. 
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Since more attention has been focused on the issue, it appears more frequently in official 
documents. 
Five states have been chosen for a content analysis of US statements toward them and 
will be presented in a case study format. Four ot the states are those most commonly 
referred to as rogues by the US during this time period. They are Iraq, Iran, Libya, and 
North Korea and are perceived as enemies of the US based on the following factors. 
First, the US government, by referring to these states as rogues, has itself defined them as 
supporting policies which conflict with its national interest. Second the US has a history 
of conflict with each of these states. Third, the US does not maintain diplomatic ties with 
these states nor strong economic ties. 
For comparative purposes, statements toward Pakistan will be examined. Pakistan is 
perceived as an ally based on the following factors. First, the US defines Pakistan as an 
ally and as maintains good diplomatic relations with it. Second, the US has a history of 
cooperation and friendship with it. Although Israel represents a better example of an 
American ally, its nuclear program is so overlooked that it has never been acknowledged, 
nor is it mentioned in official statements. 
The first part of the case study will reflect the findings of the content analysis in quan¬ 
titative terms. The description of the research design will be presented in four sections: 
1) how the sample was derived, 2) how the text was coded and the recording scheme, 3) 
what the construct for inference is, and 4) how the results will be analyzed. The second 
half of the case study will be devoted to a qualitative discussion based upon selected 
sections of text. 
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Deriving the Sample 
Deriving a sample of documents for the content analysis is necessary because the 
population of possible documents is enormous and would include at a minimum all 
presidential speeches and statements, all Congressional testimony given by members of 
the executive branch, and all interviews, speeches and press releases from all executive 
agencies and departments. The population could even be expanded beyond the executive 
branch to include statements by members of Congress, political analysts, and news com¬ 
mentators. The argument this thesis makes is that attribution bias is found across the 
spectrum of government policymakers and is a widely held assumption; however, this 
thesis has limited itself to the perceptions of the executive branch because it is most 
active in nonproliferation policy. 
A sample of documents from the executive branch has been chosen using as a source 
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM, Volume 4, Number 1 which covers a time period of 
January 1990 to May 1996.9 Although the sample of documents contained on the CD 
was not chosen randomly from the entire population, it is still random in the sense that 
the documents were chosen with no regard for the research of this study. The benefit of 
using this source instead of drawing an independent sample is that it makes it possible to 
search a large number of documents, thereby expanding the reliability of the findings. 
9The information included on the CD spans 6 major publication groups and includes 
approximately 492 separate publications and eight regional maps. The six major 
publications are the US Department of State Dispatch, Dispatch Supplements, Country 
Background Notes, Daily Press Briefing Transcripts, Congressional and Special Reports, 
and Regional Maps. 
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The documents drawn for the sample were those contained in the "speeches, testimony, 
statements" category. Documents within this category are mainly composed of speeches 
and testimony by a member of the executive branch published in the US Department of 
State Dispatch. 
To obtain the document sample for each state, the name of the state was searched for 
within the database. The subject search was not used because it excluded documents 
which only briefly mentioned one of the states, but which could be relevant to the study. 
This is because it is the text of the documents which is important to this study, not the 
documents themselves nor, to lesser extend, their context. Therefore, even fairly mean¬ 
ingless references to the state become important for what they say or do not say. 
Coding and Recording Scheme 
In order to analyze the text, the concepts of interest must be given indicators. The 
three concepts of interest are the nuclear program of each state, references to character or 
dispositional factors, and references to situational factors. Differences between situa- 
tional and dispositional attributions are not always clear as "most situational explanations 
imply assumptions about relevant dispositions."10 This has created problems for the 
measurement of attribution bias. In order to clarify the distinction the following 
I0Thomas C. Monson and Mark Snyder, "Actors, Observers, and the Attribution 
Process," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13 (1977): 90. 
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definitions will be used." Situational attributions are those explanations that state or 
imply no dispositions on the part of the actor beyond those typical of all or most actors. 
Dispositional attributions are those explanations that state or imply something unique or 
distinguishing about the actor. Another problem in the measurement of attribution arises 
from the difference between character and behavior. Information on whether attributions 
related to character and behavior are different have been mixed.12 For the purposes of 
this study, no difference will be assumed; behavior will be considered an indicator of 
character. Other research has found that in order to be meaningful, behavior must also be 
distinguished by whether it is intentional or unintentional.13 This study avoids this 
problem by focusing upon a behavior which cannot be considered anything but 
intentional—the creation of a nuclear weapons program. 
A reference to the nuclear weapons program of a state will be indicated if the terms 
"nuclear weapons," "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)," "unconventional weapons" 
or "sensitive, dual-use technology" are mentioned in relation to the state's attempts to 
produce or acquire them. Subsequent references made indirectly by referring back to the 
program will also be included as long as the reference is clear. For instance, if the WMD 
program has already been mentioned and then a reference is made to the state's "efforts" 
"Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the 
Attribution Process," in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard 
Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 5. 
"Judith A. Howard, "The Conceptualization and Measurement of Attributions," 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23 (1987): 47. 
13Peter A. White, "Ambiguity in the Internal/External Distinction in Causal Attnbu- 
ixonf Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27 (1991): 261. 
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or to "the program", this will be considered a reference to its nuclear program. Although 
WMD can refer to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, a reference to WMD will be 
taken as an indicator of its weapons program because it is usually meant to refer to all of 
these weapons. A reference specifically to a chemical or biological program will not be 
considered. Nor will general references to arms sales be considered unless it is made 
clear within the document that the arms include nuclear technology. 
The definition for a reference to the character of a state is more subjective. The US's 
perception of each state's character will not be assumed but will be denved from the text. 
Therefore, a reference to the character of a state will be taken to mean any adjective that 
is used to describe the state, its actions or its government. References to the actions, 
behavior, or intentions of the state will also be taken as indicators of character. Through 
a preliminary examination of the documents for the rogue states, character references 
were found to fall into three broad categories: direct character references, behaviors, and 
intentions. While these categories do have some over-lap, each characteristic will be 
placed into the one category it most closely fits. 
Direct character references are descriptions about the nature of the state. These would 
include descriptions of the government such as dictatorship or nondemocratic. Other 
direct character references could be isolated, fanatical or rejectionist. All these terms 
describe a relatively permanent aspect of the state. Other terms which will be considered 
direct character references will be rogue, outlaw and pariah. Although the definition of 
these terms includes ideas about behavior, character and intentions, they are intended as a 
description of the state. 
Behavior is any action, physical or symbolic, taken by the state. This would include 
sponsoring terrorism, using violence, developing chemical and biological weapons, and 
opposing the peace process. In general these behaviors are seen to violate current inter¬ 
national standards of behavior. 
Intentions are considered to be any description of the purpose behind the actions and 
character of the state. In many cases, intentions and behavior may overlap. For example, 
references to threats from a state may be taken as behavior, or as its intention to threaten. 
In general, intentions will refer to actions which the US thinks or expects a state may 
take. Intentions are usually vague such as mention of offensive capabilities, blackmail, 
threats, and efforts to control or dominate a region or resources. 
References to situational or external factors refer to factors beyond the control of the 
state. These may include changes in the international system, security concerns or econ¬ 
omic pressure. External factors are unusual circumstances which the majority of states 
do not encounter on a regular basis. 
Although it does make coding problematic, this type of open-ended coding provides 
greater flexibility and allows for characteristics which the coder may not anticipate.14 
This technique is especially useful when no previous research has been conducted. 
l4Timothy W. Elig and Irene Hanson Frieze, "Measuring Causal Attributions for 
Success and Failure," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979): 621. 
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Construct for Inference 
In order to be able to infer an association between the nuclear weapons program of a 
state and its character from the sample of documents, a recording scheme for the indica¬ 
tors was created to determine if a pattern of co-occurrence exists. Co-occurrence refers to 
frequencies and patterns of word pairs within a document.15 This type of inference is also 
called contingency analysis which involves counting how often a symbol appears in 
conjunction with another symbol.16 Work done thus far on co-occurrences suggests that 
"above and below chance co-occurrences of references to concepts within a stream of 
discourse indicate cognitive associations and dissociations, respectively."1 Thus fre¬ 
quent and spatially close references to both the nuclear program of a state and its charac¬ 
ter traits would indicate a cognitive association between the concepts. 
The recording scheme for determining co-occurrence will be as follows. All refer¬ 
ences to the nuclear program of a state within each document will be noted, if they occur. 
References to both dispositional and situational factors will also be noted, if they occur in 
the same sentence as the reference to the nuclear program or if it appears within one 
sentence of the reference, before or after. This will be considered a co-occurrence. Al¬ 
though character references will be separated by type (i.e. character, behavior, intentions), 
the important distinctions for this research are whether or not a characterization was made 
15Krippendorff, Content Analysis, 107. 
l6Louis A. Gottschalk, The Measurement of Psychological States Through the Content 
Analysis of Verbal Behavior (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 8. 
''Krippendorff, Content Analysis, 107. 
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and if it is positive or negative. A narrow range for the co-occurrence is used to enhance 
the validity that the two terms are associated. 
There are two limits to the reliability of the recording scheme. First, only one coder is 
being used; however, the instructions are explicit enough that judgment calls are mini¬ 
mized and replicability is possible. Second, because of the limited search capability of 
the database, all counts, except for the sample number of documents for each state, must 
be done by hand; however, this does allow for greater flexibility in determining indirect 
indicators. The question of reliability will be minimized by the qualitative discussion of 
the findings. 
The construct for inferring a co-occurrence will be based on "the relative frequency of 
the observed contextual dependencies."18 If a reference to the nuclear program of a state 
is mentioned, then does a character reference also occur? The analysis of the relative 
frequency of these two indicators occurring together will have two parts. First, the rela¬ 
tive frequency of co-occurrences for each state will be determined using each reference 
to the nuclear program of the state. Support for attribution bias would be indicated by a 
high relative frequency of co-occurrences; however, it could be possible that a high co¬ 
occurrence would be due to other factors such as the terms are logically co-dependent. 
Therefore the second part of the analysis will compare the results of each state to the 
same analysis for Pakistan. By comparing the four rogue states to Pakistan it can be 
determined whether or not the distribution of the two concepts among the rogue states is 
normal for all states, or is specific to the rogue states. Even if the relative frequency of 
l8Ibid., 100. 
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co-occurrences among the rogue states is low, a significantly higher or lower frequency 
for Pakistan would indicate a difference. Additionally, the results will be analyzed by 
type of characteristic to see if any patterns emerge. 
Example 
The following excerpt will be used to demonstrate how the text will be coded. 
When such leaders sit atop regional powers, such as Iran and Iraq, they may engage in 
violence and lawlessness that threaten the United States and other democracies. Such 
reactionary, "backlash" states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely 
to suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries, and threaten their neighbors.19 
The reference to the nuclear program of both Iran and Iraq occurs in the second 
sentence of the example and the sentence before and after are included. References to 
character include "reactionary", "backlash" and "regional power". References to 
behavior include engaging in violence, lawlessness, sponsoring terrorism, suppressing 
their own people, fomenting ethnic rivalries and threatening neighbors, the US and other 
democracies. At first it would appear that the references to behavior would be coded as 
intentions; however, it has been established that the US sees these states as engaging in 
these activities, not merely intending to do so. No situational references were noted. 
Table 1 provides an example of how the text will be coded into quantitative data. 
l9Anthony Uake, "From Containment to Enlargement," (address at the School of 
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 21 September 
1993 ) US Department of State Dispatch 4, no.39 (27 September 1993): 658-664, 
reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: 
Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
70 
Table 1. Coding Example for Content Analysis 
Total Documents 1 
References to Nuclear Weapons Program 1 
Number of Character Co-occurrences 1 
Number of Situational Co-occurrences 0 
The total number of co-occurrences is based upon each reference to the nuclear 
weapons program. Therefore, although many references were made to the character of 
Iraq in the example, since there was only one mention of the nuclear program, there can 
be only one co-occurrence. In Table 2, the types of co-occurrences are broken down to 
provide more information about what types of references were made. 
Table 2. Coding Fxnmple for Dispositional Co-occurrences  
Type of Co-occurrence a % 
Direct Character 1 100 
Intentions 0  
Behavior 1 100 
Note: Percentages based upon 1 dispositional co-occurrence. Percentages will not add to 
100%. 
This breakdown acknowledges that several different character references may be made 
in conjunction with one reference to the nuclear weapons program; however, although 
several different direct character and behavior references were made, they were counted 
as one co-occurrence. This was done to prevent the data from distorting how often these 
types of references are made. 
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The second part of the analysis will be qualitative and use text examples from the 
sample of documents. The qualitative examples will highlight any patterns found in the 
quantitative data. This discussion will also provide greater detail such as variation across 
time, emergent patterns and differences between the cases. 
CHAPTER 6 
IRAQ 
Iraq's nuclear program began in the 1970s when it contracted to purchase the Osiraq 
research reactor from France.1 Although Iraq was party to the Nonproliferation Treaty 
and its nuclear facilities were under inspection by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), Israel, fearful of Iraq's intentions, bombed Osiraq in June 1981.2 After 
the destruction of the reactor, Iraq began a clandestine program in 1982 code named 
"Petrochemical 3."3 It was not until after the Persian Gulf War, that the extent of this 
program was discovered. 
In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687 which 
established procedures for "the destruction of Iraq's unconventional weapons and ballistic 
missile capabilities and a subsequent monitoring program to prevent their reconstruc¬ 
tion."4 When inspections were begun under the auspices of the United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the IAEA discovered that Iraq had made substantial 
'Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 187. 
2Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions , 188. 
3Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 188. 
4Ibid. 
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progress in developing uranium enrichment technology and weapon designs. Some 
estimated that Iraq had been only a couple of years away from having a fully assembled 
device. This research occurred in violation of Iraq's NPT obligations and while under 
IAEA inspections. 
Since 1991 numerous inspection teams have discovered, documented and destroyed 
Iraq's capacity to build weapons of mass destruction; however, the delays and deceit by 
Iraqi officials have raised fears of hidden materials.5 Also, many of the scientists and 
technicians who contributed to the program remain in Iraq. Even so, Iraq's current ability 
to produce weapons of mass destruction is curtailed by the destruction of its facilities, 
sanctions, and continued monitoring by the IAEA and UN. 
US Relationship and Policy 
Throughout the 1980s, the US and Iraq enjoyed semi-friendly relations. The US 
supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained diplomatic and economic relations, and 
provided loans in the form of grain credits. US nonproliferation policies were laxly 
enforced against Iraq and many of the materials used in its weapons program were pro¬ 
cured from the US and other Western nations. Further, the bulk of the funding for its 
nuclear weapons program went through an Atlanta branch of the Italian National Bank. 
This relationship drastically changed when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Soon 
Iraq had changed from an ally to a state compared to Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
5Ueventhal, "Plugging the Leaks," 173. 
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Union.6 Iraq became the first official rogue state targeted by the US. The subsequent 
discovery of its nuclear weapons program added to the image. 
US nonproliferation policy toward Iraq since 1990 is closely intertwined with the 
broad array of policies designed to oust Iraq from Kuwait, protect its minority popula¬ 
tions and end its support for terrorism. Unofficially it is hoped that these policies will 
remove Saddam Hussein from power. Iraq has been subject to numerous UN Secunty 
Council Resolutions. These have mandated Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the destruc¬ 
tion of its nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities, an end to its repression of minori¬ 
ties, an end to its support for terrorism, and war reparations to Kuwait. Until Iraq 
complies with these resolutions, it remains under UN sanctions restricting both its 
imports and exports. The US insists that Iraq must meet all UN Resolutions before any 
sanctions are lifted. Despite Iraq's compliance with many of the resolutions and increas¬ 
ing opposition from other states such as France which feel it is time to begin removing 
sanctions, sanctions remain in effect. In several instances, the US unilaterally changed 
the requirements for the lifting of sanctions.8 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that US policymakers are affected by attribution bias in 
their perceptions of Iraq. These biases are generated in part by the relationship between 
the US and Iraq. This leads to an overperception of threat which is reflected in the harsh 
policies adopted. Iraq's nuclear program is considered the result of its aggressive and 
6William A. Gamson, "Hiroshima, the Holocaust, and the Politics of Exclusion," 
American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 7. 
7Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy," 70. 
8Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 196. 
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ambitious government and is a symbol of its hostile intentions. This perception linking 
the nuclear program to the character of the state heightens the sense of threat and discour¬ 
ages diplomacy. 
Content Analysis 
In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 466 documents which pertained 
to Iraq between the period January 1990 and May 1996. The qualitative results showing 
the dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iraq are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences 
 # of co-occurrences  _iL 
Dispositional (negative) 151 74.8 
Situational  0.0 
Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 202 references to the nuclear program of Iraq. 
Of the 202 separate references to the nuclear program of Iraq, 151 co-occurred with a 
negative reference to the character of Iraq resulting in a 74.8% co-occurrence. There was 
only one situational co-occurrence. These data indicate that US policymakers associated 
the character of Iraq with its nuclear program. In Table 4 the breakdown of specific 
dispositional and situational references by type is shown. 
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Table 4. Iraq: Dispositional and Situational References 
DIRFCT THARACTF.R RF.FF.RF.NCFS 
pariah/outlaw/rogue/renegade 
backlash/reactionary 
repressive dictatorship/undemocratic/despot 
ambitious 
madman 
untrustworthy 
malevolent 
isolated 
INTENTIONS 
attack other states 
target capitals 
offensive missile capability 
weapons beyond defensive needs 
threat to regional and international peace and stability 
threaten neighbors and US interests 
rebuild WMD 
blackmail 
sow violence and disorder 
dominate the Middle East 
control energy supplies of the world 
regional hegemony 
revive a hot war 
expansionistic 
RFHAVIOR 
threatens/intimidates 
neighbors 
United States 
other democracies 
democratic rights of its citizens 
enemy of the Middle East peace process 
sponsors terrorism 
contributing to tensions 
possesses biological and chemical weapons 
used chemical weapons 
uses violence 
militarizing 
invaded its neighbors and Kuwait 
continued dispute with Kuwait 
foments ethnic rivalries 
human rights abuses 
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Table 4-Continued 
inhumane policies 
dangerous 
repressive 
aggressive 
lawless 
brutal 
unpeaceful 
contempt for civilized rules 
manipulates hostages 
noncompliance with UN resolutions and IAEA 
hiding biological program 
intimidates the UN 
noncooperation 
deceives and threatens inspectors 
denies nuclear program 
lied 
interfering with humanitarian efforts 
unconditionally accepted UN Resolution 687 
SITUATIONAL 
insecurity due to the collapse of the USSR 
All of the dispositional references made were negative except one. The one positive 
behavior reference, Iraq's unconditional acceptance of UN Resolution 687 mandating the 
destruction of its WMD facilities, occurred in June 1991, before Iraq began evading com¬ 
pliance. The term "isolated" could be taken as an indicator of Iraq's insecurity. Yet in 
the context used, it referred to Iraq's isolation from the international community brought 
about by its behavior. The frequency of dispositional references by type in Table 5 
shows that the majority of dispositional references were to Iraq's behavior. 
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Table 5. Iraq: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type  
Type of Co-occurrence & %_ 
Direct Character 37 24.5 
Intentions 49 32.5 
Behavior 114 75.5 
Note: Totals based upon 151 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of 
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (202): direct 
character, 18.3%; intentions, 24.3%; and, behavior, 56.4%. 
The majority of the character references to Iraq concerned its behavior which occurred 
in 75.5% of the co-occurrences. The predominant themes of behavior were Iraq's aggres¬ 
sion and its unwillingness to comply with international standards and UN Resolutions. 
There was a low co-occurrence with direct character references, 24.5%. Many of the 
character references, such as madman, malevolent, dictator, ambitious, and untrustwor¬ 
thy, referred specifically to Saddam Hussein. This suggests that the US attributes the 
actions of Iraq, including its nuclear program, to the personality of Saddam Hussein. 
This is supported by the frequent statement by the US during and after the Gulf War that 
its quarrel was not with the people of Iraq, but with its government.9 
The co-occurrence of intentions, 32.5%, reveals that the US has little trust in Iraq and 
believes that it fully intends to continue its aggressive policies and weapons program as 
soon as sanctions are removed. 
9Ronald Neumann, "Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Iraq," (address at the 
Meridian International Center, Washington DC, 27 January 1994) US Department of 
State Dispatch 5, no.7 ( 7 February 1994): 66-68, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on 
CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬ 
tion bias in its perceptions of Iraq's nuclear program. Iraq's nuclear program is a 
reflection of its character, embodied in Saddam Hussein, and its unacceptable behavior. 
The program was not attributed to situational factors. 
Discussion 
Between January 1990 and 1 August 1990, there were no references to Iraq's nuclear 
program. References began after its invasion of Kuwait. During the Persian Gulf War 
there was a 100% co-occurrence between references to its nuclear program and negative 
character references. Since the end of the war, the percentage of co-occurrences re¬ 
mained above 63%. 
Although the most prominent character reference was "rogue", many character 
references centered on Saddam Hussein and attributed the nuclear program to his per¬ 
sonal ambitions. As George Ward, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International 
Organizations Affairs, said. 
Coupled with the continuation of his tyrannical practices, Saddam Hussein's efforts to 
evade the eliminations of his weapons of mass destruction complete the portrait of a 
classic dictator, dangerous both to his own people and to his neighbors.10 
10George F. Ward Jr., "Iraq's Non-Compliance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions," (statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and 
on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Commit¬ 
tee, Washington DC, 29 July 1992) US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 31 (3 August 
1992): 602-611, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l 
(Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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By linking the nuclear program to the personality of Hussein, the US feels it is unable 
to trust Iraq until he is removed from power. 
The most frequent type of co-occurrence links the behavior of Iraq to its quest for 
nuclear weapons. By linking its violations of international standards to its nuclear 
program, the idea is reinforced that Iraq would not hesitate to violate other standards such 
as the use of nuclear weapons. In a 1995 speech, Deputy Secretary Talbott cited several 
of Iraq's concerning behaviors in conjunction with its nuclear program. 
As we reward the makers of peace, we must also deal firmly and consistently with the 
enemies of peace. That is why it is so important to continue our opposition to Iran and 
Iraq, the Middle East's most dangerous actors. These two nations are not only the 
most ardent opponents of the Middle East peace process; they are also the world's 
most flagrant state sponsors of terrorism—and they both seek to become nuclear 
powers." 
References to its support for terrorism especially increase the perception of threat 
posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of Iraq. 
Although references to its behavior predominated, the statements about its intentions 
most clearly reveal how the US perceives the nuclear program of Iraq. The next three 
text examples incorporate references to character, behavior and intentions. The US 
perceives Iraq's intentions for developing nuclear weapons to be solely for the purpose of 
aggression. Vice President Quayle made this perception explicit in a 1991 speech. 
"Strobe Talbott, "American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World," (remarks to 
the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 24 April 1995) US Department of State 
Dispatch 6, no.18 (1 May 1995): 372-376, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD- 
Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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They [the American people] know that over the past decade, Saddam Hussein has 
bankrupted his people to bankroll his army. They know that he has launched two wars 
of aggression, against Iran and against Kuwait, at the cost of some 1 million casualties. 
They know that he is acquiring a stockpile of chemical and biological agents and has 
used chemical weapons against both Iran and his own people. They know he has 
launched an intensive campaign to acquire nuclear weapons. .And they know that 
unless he is stopped today, nuclear- armed Iraq will control the bulk of the world's 
energy supply tomorrow, thereby holding a gun to all our heads.12 
President Bush also expressly linked Iraq's nuclear program to Saddam Hussein. 
I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his 
ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device. We've seen him 
use chemical weapons on his own people. We've seen him take his own country, one 
that should be wealthy and prosperous, and turn it into a poor country - all because of 
(his) insatiable appetite for military equipment and conquest.13 
And Secretary of State James Baker stated in a 1990 speech. 
We understand that we can sacrifice now, or we can pay an even stiffer price later as 
Saddam moves to multiply his WMD: chemical, biological and, most ominous, 
nuclear. And we know that Saddam Hussein has never possessed a weapon that he 
hasn't used. And we will not allow the hope for a more peaceful world to rest in the 
hands of this brutal dictator.14 
The US perceives Iraq as hostile and ambitious. It intends to develop nuclear weapons 
in order to dominate the Middle East and blackmail other states. These ambitions are 
l2Dan Quayle, "America's Forces in the Gulf are Ready," (address to the Los 
Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA, 8 January 1991) US Department of 
State Dispatch 2, no.2 (14 January 1991): 26-29 , reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on 
CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
13George Bush, "The Gulf: A World United Against Aggression," (opening 
statement at a White House news conference, Washington DC, 30 November 1990) US 
Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 14 (3 December 1990): 295-296, reproduced in U.S. 
Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public 
Affairs, June 1996.) 
14James Baker, "Gulf Crisis: At a Crossroads," (remarks before the UN Security 
Council, New York City, 29 November 1990) US Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 14 
(3 December 1990): 297-298 reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 
4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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part of the character of Iraq and will not be changed by the imposition of sanctions or UN 
monitoring. If Iraq were to be released from sanctions, the US believes that it would 
instantly revive its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. This belief is used to 
justify the continuation of sanctions even after Iraq has complied with UN Resolutions. 
The character of Iraq is personified by Saddam Hussein. Many of the behaviors, 
intentions, and character references are made specifically about him. This suggests that 
the US's perception of Iraq could change dramatically if he were removed from power. 
Although Iraq's program has been dismantled, it remains in the rogue category 
because of its efforts to prevent inspections and unwillingness to comply with UN 
Resolutions. Iraq's past and present actions have shown it to be aggressive and in viola¬ 
tion of many international standards. Yet US policy has also been influenced by the 
perception that Iraq is determined to build nuclear weapons. While US fears may be 
justified, the experience of Iraq has influenced the US's perceptions of the other states 
classified as rogues. 
CHAPTER 7 
IRAN 
Iran's nuclear program began under the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and was 
inherited by the Khomeini government when it seized power in 1979. The weapons 
research continued, but was slowed by the turmoil of the revolution and the following 
eight year war with Iraq.1 In 1988, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran began to re¬ 
build its nuclear infrastructure and to cultivate relationships with foreign suppliers which 
included Argentina, Pakistan, China, North Korea, South Africa, and Russia.2 
Despite the acceleration of Iran's nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, it is 
believed to be rudimentary and eight to ten years from producing a nuclear device.3 This 
time could be shortened with substantial foreign assistance. Iran is a party to the Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty (NPT) and its nuclear facilities are under International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Iran officially denies that it is pursuing nuclear weapons and 
two IAEA inspections have revealed no evidence of NPT violations. Iran says its nuclear 
program is intended solely for energy purposes. 
'Spector and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, 203. 
2Ibid., 213-214. 
3Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 119. 
83 
84 
US Relationship and Policy 
The US's relationship with Iran has suffered due to their history of conflict. The US 
enjoyed good relations with Iran under the Shah's pro-Westem regime. This changed 
when the revolution occurred and fifty-two American diplomats were taken hostage. The 
US severed diplomatic relations with Iran which have yet to be restored. Iran has been 
placed under increasing trade and investment restrictions by the US. These sanctions are 
in response to a number of behaviors which include its efforts to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction, support for terrorism, opposition to the Middle East peace process, 
threats against its neighbors, and its poor human rights record.4 Despite tensions, the US 
has not ruled out the possibility of improved relations if Iran were to modify its behavior. 
Since the 1980s, Iran has been subject to a number of export and trade controls from 
the US. All dual-use and military items are prohibited from export as well as any addi¬ 
tional items forbidden under anti-terrorism legislation.5 In 1994 the President issued an 
executive order that banned all direct and indirect trade and investment with Iran.6 The 
1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act takes sanctions to an extreme and allows the US to 
sanction foreign firms doing business with these states. The US has pressed to create 
multilateral sanctions on Iran, but has failed to gain the support of the international 
4US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 
Background Notes-Iran 5, no.8 (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994.) 
5Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 119. 
6Power, "Middle East Nuclear Issues," 200. 
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community. It has persuaded some third parties not to make loans or grant debt relief to 
Iran.7 
After the Persian Gulf War, the US began focusing upon Iran's weapons programs. In 
1994 and into early 1995, the US implemented a policy of complete nuclear denial to 
Iran.8 Iran argued that this violated Article VI under the NPT which requires the sharing 
of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and hinted that it would terminate its NPT 
membership. Also in 1994 Russia was pressured into halting the sale of two reactors to 
Iran. Although no specific threats were made to Russia, it was implied that if the sale 
occurred, Russian aid would need to be reevaluated and that its relationship with the US 
would be undermined.9 
The hypothesis is that due to the US's antagonistic relationship with Iran, US policy¬ 
makers are affected by attribution bias in their perceptions of Iran. Iran's nuclear program 
will be attributed to its internal character which the US perceives as aggressive and unac- 
cepting of international norms. This perception leads policymakers to overestimate threat 
and prefer sanctions and threats to diplomacy. 
7Ibid. 
8
 Ibid., 199. 
9Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 120. 
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Content Analysis 
In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 201 documents pertaining to 
Iran between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 6 the qualitative results showing the 
frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences for Iran are shown. 
raoie o. iran: uisposuionai ana mmanonai r o-occurrences 
# of co-occurrences % 
Dispositional (negative) 75 
Situational 0 
67.6 
0 
Note: Percentages are based upon a total of 111 references to the nuclear program of Iran. 
Of the 111 separate references to the nuclear program of Iran, 75 co-occurred with a 
negative reference to the character of Iran resulting in a 61.6% co-occurrence. There 
were no situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed 
the nuclear program of Iran to its character, not external factors. In Table 7 the break¬ 
down of specific dispositional references by type is shown. 
Table 7. Iran: Dispositional References 
DIRF.rT CHAR ATTFR RFFFRF.NCF.S 
pariah/rogue/outlaw/renegade 
reactionary/backlash 
irresponsible 
intolerant 
truculent 
isolated 
important 
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Table 7-Continued 
INTRNTIONS 
threat to peace, security and stability 
engaged in a military build-up 
security risk 
blackmail 
sow violence and disorder throughout the region and beyond 
energetically seek to develop WMD 
potential adversary 
BF.HAVIOR 
supports terrorism 
opposes the Middle East peace process 
threatens and menaces neighbors and the US 
human rights abuses 
concerning/unacceptable policies and behavior 
uses violence and terror 
dangerous 
supports extremist groups 
intimidates and eliminates opponents 
outlaw behavior 
assassination 
supports terror and subversion 
pursues destabilization policies 
violates norms and basic standards of international conduct 
lawless 
suppress its own people 
undermines peace 
heavy-handed assertion of authority 
All of the dispositional references made were negative except one, the 
reference "important." The frequency of dispositional references by type 
shows that the majority of these references were to Iran's behavior. 
character 
in Table 8 
88 
Table 8. Iran: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type 
Type of Co-occurrencfi 
Direct Character 
Intentions 
Behavior 
17 
57 
21 28.0 
22.7 
76.0 
Note: Percentages based upon 75 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of 
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (111): direct 
character, 18.9%; intentions, 15.3%; and, behavior, 51.4%. 
The majority of the character references to Iran concerned its behavior which occurred 
in 76% of the co-occurrences. In general the references were to Iran's threatening 
behavior and its violations of international standards. Of the 57 behavior co-occurrences 
45 included reference to Iran's support for terrorism. 
There were lower co-occurrences with direct character references and intentions. 
These references indicated that the US perceived Iran as developing its nuclear program 
for aggressive purposes. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬ 
tion bias in its perceptions of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program is a reflec¬ 
tion of its character which is most clearly exemplified by its unacceptable behaviors. 
There were no references, either directly or indirectly, to any external motivations. 
Discussion 
No mention was made of Iran's nuclear program during 1990-91, the Persian Gulf War 
period. During this time, US references to Iran were cautiously positive, citing its 
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noninterference and support for sanctions during the Gulf War. In 1992, the US began 
increasingly to focus upon the nuclear program of Iran as a potential Iraq. 
By linking Iran's quest for nuclear weapons with other unacceptable behaviors such as 
terrorism, the US heightens the perception of threat posed by its program. As Secretary 
of State Christopher stated, 
Iran's role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism makes its secret quest for 
weapons of mass destruction even more alarming. We must stand together to prevent 
Iran from acquiring such threatening capabilities.10 
Although support for terrorism is the predominate behavioral reference, the US also 
links Iran's nuclear program with a number of other unacceptable behaviors. In a 1995 
speech, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tamoff said. 
On April 30 of this year. President Clinton announced his decision to sever all trade 
and investment ties between the United States and Iran. These new sanctions represent 
American willingness to take actions - even those that may hurt competing US 
interests - to increase the cost to Iran of its irresponsible behavior. Iran engages in 
terrorism, obstructs the Arab-Israeli peace process, pursues weapons of mass destruc¬ 
tion, pursues a threatening military build-up in the Persian Gulf, and abuses the human 
rights of its citizens. These activities, which threaten important US interests, should be 
unacceptable to all members of the international community." 
By associating Iran's nuclear program with other unacceptable and aggressive 
behaviors, the intentions behind its program become more suspect. The US also 
10Warren Christopher, "The U.N.: The Momentum for Reform Must Accelerate," 
(address at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 25 September 
1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.40 (2 October 1995): 711-714, reproduced 
in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of 
Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
"Peter Tamoff, "Sanctions on Iran," (statement before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington DC, 11 October 1995) US Department 
of State Dispatch 6, no.43 (23 October 1995): 768-770, reproduced in U.S. Foreign 
Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 
1996.) 
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perceives parallels between the programs of Iran and Iraq which casts further doubts upon 
the intentions of Iran. In 1995, Secretary of State Christopher said, 
Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons also poses enormous dangers - for countries 
in the region and for all of us. Every responsible member of the international commu¬ 
nity has an interest in seeing those efforts fail. There is absolutely no room for com¬ 
placency. Remember Iraq: Five years ago, too many were willing to give Saddam 
Hussein the benefit of the doubt. We must not make the same mistake with Iran.12 
Since the US emphasizes the behavior of Iran, not its form of government or leader, it 
is possible that the US would be willing to improve relations with Iran if its behavior 
were modified. As Secretary Christopher stated, 
Iran is an important country that could make significant contributions to the interna¬ 
tional community. But first it must end behavior which threatens its neighbors and 
seeks to undermine the pursuit of peace. Iran must end its support for terrorism, its 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and its efforts to undermine the peace 
process. We will work with our friends in the region and with other nations to make 
sure that Iran's leaders under stand the high costs of continuing to pursue destabilizing 
policies.13 
The US attributes Iran's nuclear program to its hostile character, behavior, and 
intentions. Iran is not developing nuclear weapons because of security concerns with Iraq 
or Israel, but because of its ambitious and aggressive nature. This perception is reflected 
in the US's unwillingness to trust Iran with any type of nuclear technology. 
12Warren Christopher, "American Leadership in the Middle East: Supporting the 
Friends and Opposing the Enemies of Peace," (address before the National Leadership 
Conference of the Anti-Defamation League, Washington DC, 4 April 1995) US Depart¬ 
ment of State Dispatch 6, no.15 (10 April 1995): 292-295, reproduced in U.S. Foreign 
Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 
1996.) 
13Warren Christopher, "U.S. Commitment to the Middle East Peace Process," (address 
before the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Arlington, VA, 23 April 
1993) US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 18 (5 May 1993): 309-311, reproduced in 
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public 
Affairs, June 1996.) 
CHAPTER 8 
LIBYA 
Libya's first attempt to acquire nuclear weapons occurred in 1970 when it tried to 
purchase nuclear arms from China.' Although this attempt failed, Libya, under the 
leadership of Muammer Khadafi, continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons by beginning 
an indigenous program and through repeated attempts to purchase them. This behavior 
occurred despite Libya's accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. 
Libya failed to make substantial progress in its nuclear program via either of these 
routes. As of 1995, Libya has made little progress in developing the necessary infrastruc¬ 
ture to manufacture a nuclear device. It currently possesses one 10 MWt light water 
research reactor located at Tajoura which is operating under International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) inspections.2 Likewise, its continued attempts to purchase a nuclear 
device, especially since the breakup of the USSR, have been unsuccessful. 
The embryonic nature of its nuclear program has not prevented a rhetorical stance by 
Libya which identifies it as a proliferation concern. Khadafi has continued to assert that 
'Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 141. 
2Ibid., 143. This type of reactor uses low-enriched uranium as fuel and is considered a 
low proliferation risk. 
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the Arab states should possess a nuclear device against other nuclear nations such as the 
US and Israel. In a 1987 speech, Khadafi stated. 
If there is going to be a game using atomic bombs, then it should not be played against 
the Arab nation. The Arabs should have it, but we undertake not to drop it on anyone. 
However, if someone is going to drop one on us, or if someone is going to threaten our 
existence and independence even without the use of an atomic weapon, then we should 
drop it on them. This is an essential defensive weapon.3 
US Relationship and Policy 
The US's perception of Libya is influenced by both its behavior and its rhetoric. Libya 
obviously has ambitions to develop nuclear weapons; however, the US's perception is 
also influenced by its relationship with Libya. This relationship has continued to decline 
since Khadafi came to power in 1969 and the US was forced to evacuate in 1970.4 The 
US has not maintained diplomatic relations with Libya since 1981 when it closed the 
Libyan embassy in Washington. In 1986, the US bombed Libya for its suspected involve¬ 
ment in the Berlin discotheque terrorist bombing.5 
As with Iraq and Iran, the US has implemented nonproliferation policies against Libya 
which are harsher and broader than those applied to other countries. Libya is denied 
3
"A1-Qadhdhafi Lectures University Students," Tripoli Television Service, 2032 GMT, 
2 November 1987, translated in FBIS-NES, (3 November 1987): 19, quoted in Spector 
and Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, 178. 
4Mansour O. El-Kikhia, Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction (Gainesville, 
FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), x. 
5US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 
Background Notes-Libya 5, no.8 (Washington DC: GPO, July 1994.) 
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nuclear exports. It is also under the same trade and investment restrictions as Iran, in¬ 
cluding bans on imports and exports, travel and commercial contracts. These sanctions 
are in response to a multitude of behaviors including its support for international terror¬ 
ism, specifically its involvement in the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings. These 
incidents also led to UN Security Council Resolutions which the US fully supports. 
The hypothesis is that US policymakers are affected by perceptual biases which attrib¬ 
ute the nuclear program of Libya to its internal character. It wants to develop nuclear 
weapons because it is violent, aggressive, and ambitious. The US perceives its nuclear 
program as both a result and an indicator of its hostile intentions and character. This 
perception heightens the sense of threat from this state. As with Iraq and Iran, this 
demonization does not allow for diplomacy or negotiation in dealing with this state. 
Content Analysis 
In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 100 documents which pertained 
to Libya between the period January 1990 and May 1996. Table 9 shows the quantitative 
results of the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences. 
Table 9. Libya: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences  
 # of co-occurrences %  
Dispositional (negative) 18 85.7 
Situational 0 0 
Note: Percentages based upon 21 references to the nuclear program of Libya. 
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Of the 21 separate references to the nuclear program of Libya, 18 co-occurred with a 
reference to the character of Libya, resulting in an 85.7% co-occurrence. There were no 
situational co-occurrences. These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the 
nuclear program of Libya to its character, not external factors. In Table 10 the break¬ 
down of specific dispositional references by type is shown. 
Table 10. Libya: Dispositional References 
DIRF.CT CHARACTF.R RFFFRFNCF 
rogue, outlaw, pariah 
isolated 
force of rejection 
no accountability of leaders 
INTFNTIONS 
poses a threat 
weapons for attack 
BFHAVTOR 
sponsors terrorism 
enemy of the peace process 
uses violence 
destabilizing activities 
threatens its citizens 
possesses chemical weapons 
destabilizing activities 
threatens others 
All of the references to Libya's character, intentions, and behavior were negative. The 
frequencies of dispositional references by type in Table 11 shows that the majority of the 
references pertained to Libya's character. 
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Table 11. Libya: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type  
Type of Co-occurrence £ %  
Direct Character 13 72.2 
Intentions 4 22.2 
Behavior 11 61.1 
Note: Percentages based upon 18 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of 
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (21): direct 
character, 61.9%; intentions, 19.0%; and, behavior, 52.4%. 
The most prominent references were to its character which occurred in 72.2% of the 
co-occurrences. The most common character reference was rogue, which encompasses 
its character, behavior and intentions. The term rogue, pariah, or outlaw occurred in 
57.1 % of the co-occurrences. Also there was a strong co-occurrence with its behavior, 
especially its support for international terrorism, which occurred in 52.4% of all refer¬ 
ences to its nuclear program. 
The character reference of "isolated" could be understood to mean that Libya is 
insecure and therefore feels the need to defend itself; however, as with Iraq, in the con¬ 
text of the speeches examined, "isolated" referred to the idea that Libya's behavior has 
isolated it from the international community and that it needs to be isolated in order to 
control its behavior. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬ 
tion bias in its perceptions of Libya's nuclear program. Libya's nuclear program is a 
refiection of its character and an example of its unacceptable behavior. There were no 
references, either directly or indirectly, to any possible external motivation such as pres¬ 
sure by another state or security concerns. 
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Discussion 
As with Iran, no mention was made of Libya's program during 1990-91, the Gulf War 
period. Beginning in 1992 and steadily increasing each year, the US began focusing 
upon Libya as a rogue state and comparing it to Iraq. 
Libya provides the fewest references to a nuclear program of the four rogues discus¬ 
sed. In addition, Libya is often mentioned in conjunction with Iraq and Iran; therefore, 
only two additional examples will be discussed here to illustrate the points already made. 
First, the US associates Libya's nuclear program with the nature of its regime and 
attributes hostile intentions to it. As Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern Affairs, said. 
The situation is particularly grim in Iraq and Libya. These outlaw states illustrate the 
general point I made earlier: regimes which threaten their citizen's democratic rights 
also threaten other regimes and peoples. Acting without accountability, their leaders 
have poured their national treasure into militarization and efforts to produce WMD - 
biological, chemical and nuclear. Although the drive to acquire such horrific weapons 
was largely designed to attack other states and peoples, Saddam Hussein's use of 
chemical weapons on his own people in northern Iraq showed that the line between 
domestic and international violence of despots is blurred.6 
This statement clearly reflects the belief that Libya's (and Iraq's) purpose in develop¬ 
ing nuclear weapons is for offensive purposes. By linking its behavior to Iraq, the 
inference becomes that Libya would not hesitate to use WMD if acquired, just as Iraq has 
done. It also suggests that their drive for WMD is linked to the undemocratic nature of 
6Robert H. Pelletreau, "Political Reform in the Middle East: America's Stake" 
(remarks made before the Foundation for Democratization and Political Liberalization in 
the Middle East, Washington DC, 20 October 1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, 
no.44 (30 October 1995): 800-802, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD- 
Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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these regimes by saying that the leaders have no accountability and threaten their citizens' 
democratic rights. As with Iraq, Libya's WMD programs are seen to be the product of the 
state's desire, embodied in its leadership. 
Second, the US also associates Libya's nuclear program with other unacceptable 
behaviors and violations of international standards, especially terrorism. Edward 
Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated, 
We are cooperating closely with the United Nations and a coalition of allies to end 
Libyan- sponsored terrorism. The United States is playing a leading role in the inter¬ 
national effort to ensure that the Libyan Government complies with all aspects of U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748, including bringing the perpetrators of 
the Pan Am [flight] 103 and UTA [flight] 772 bombings to justice and ceasing its sup¬ 
port for terrorism and pursuit of non-conventional weapons.~ 
The association between terrorism and WMD suggests the belief that Libya would use 
these weapons in terrorist attacks or provide them to terrorist organizations. In addition, 
by associating other unacceptable behaviors with the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the pos¬ 
sibility that Libya would violate international standards and use nuclear weapons is en¬ 
hanced. References to its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process reinforces Libya's 
unpeaceful image. 
While Libya has made the least progress in its weapons program, it has had an 
antagonistic relationship with the US longer than Iraq or Iran. Virtually no ties between 
Libya and the US exist. Its nuclear program is the most consistently cast in threatening 
terms and attributed to the internal character of the state. 
7Edward P. Djerejian, "Review of US Efforts to Achieve Near East Policy Goals," 
(statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 24 June 1992) US. Department of State Dispatch 3, 
no.26 (29 June 1992): 514-518, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD- 
Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
CHAPTER 9 
NORTH KOREA 
Although North Korea's interest in nuclear weapons dates from the 1950s, there was 
no indication of substantial progress until 1984 when the US detected the construction of 
a large reactor at Yongbyon.1 North Korea signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1985, but did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) until April 1992. During that time, North Korea developed an extensive 
nuclear weapons program and may have reprocessed enough plutonium to create one or 
two nuclear devices." When the IAEA was allowed to inspect North Korea's facilities in 
May 1992, it found discrepancies in its records for plutonium production.3 When the 
IAEA called for a special inspection to resolve the discrepancy, North Korea refused and 
announced it would withdraw from the NPT. 
The crisis over inspections lasted until 21 October 1994 when the US and North Korea 
concluded the "Agreed Framework." Under this agreement. North Korea agreed to freeze 
construction on its nuclear facilities, allow the IAEA to verify the freeze, not to reprocess 
'Michael Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from 
North Korea," International Security 20, no.2 (Fall 1995): 94. 
"Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 103. 
3Ibid. 
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its spent fuel, and ultimately, to ship all its spent fuel out of the country and dismantle all 
its facilities of proliferation concern. In return, North Korea would receive two light- 
water reactors, aid in meeting its energy needs, and security assurances. Light-water 
reactors are considered proliferation resistant because they produce only small amounts 
of plutonium. The US and South Korea would also work to improve relations with North 
Korea.4 Improving relations and addressing other issues of concern were considered vital 
by the US in the negotiation of the Framework. 
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, the status of North Korea's 
nuclear weapons program is uncertain. The US government is optimistic that its program 
has been halted and will ultimately be completely dismantled. Critics of the agreement, 
however, believe North Korea may be hiding nuclear materials and using the agreement 
to give it more time to develop weapons. Their biggest criticism is that North Korea does 
not have to submit to inspections until the two light-water reactors are completed. This 
could take from four to six years. During that time. North Korea could produce enough 
plutonium for several weapons. 
US Relationship and Policy 
The US and North Korea had a hostile relationship throughout the Cold War period. 
They engaged in open hostilities during the Korean War and tensions continued when 
North Korea aligned with the Soviet block. The US's security commitment to South 
4Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 276-280. 
100 
Korea kept tensions alive through the 1980s. During this time the US and North Korea 
maintained no diplomatic or economic ties. 
After the collapse of the USSR, there was potential for improved relations. During 
this time. North Korea began a dialogue with South Korea and the US on security issues. 
In September 1991 President Bush announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons 
from the Korean peninsula. Later that year, North and South Korea signed a Non- 
aggression and Reconciliation Agreement and agreed to conduct bilateral inspections on 
their nuclear facilities. It also cooperated with the US on MIAs from the Korean War. 
These small steps at reducing tensions were hindered when the crisis over inspections 
erupted. 
Some scholars and politicians believe that North Korea used its nuclear program as 
leverage to gain diplomatic recognition from the US and improve relations.5 With the 
end of the Cold War, North Korea had lost its major supporter and now found itself more 
isolated from the international community than ever before. While Russia and China 
moved to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, the US did not extend similar 
overtures to North Korea. The worsening economic conditions further undermined the 
regime. The inspections crisis gave North Korea the leverage to begin a dialogue with 
the US on political and economic issues which has improved its international position. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the US had no nuclear dealings with North Korea. 
As a client of the USSR, it was considered the Soviet's nonproliferation concern. Since 
the breakup of the USSR, the US has followed a policy of strict technology denial toward 
5Ibid., 231. 
101 
North Korea. Although concerned over its missile sales to other countries, the US did not 
become overly involved in nonproliferation efforts toward it until its attempted with¬ 
drawal from the NPT. At this time the US's immediate response was to sanction North 
Korea by banning arms imports and exports, followed by termination of international 
financial dealing if it continued to refuse inspections.6 There was also discussion of 
military strikes to destroy its nuclear facilities. Allies of the US such as Japan and South 
Korea, opposed sanctions, fearing that they would prompt further proliferation by North 
Korea. The crisis was averted when former President Jimmy Carter began mediation 
with North Korea which resulted in the "Agreed Framework." 
Unlike policy toward the other rogue states, US policy mixed sanctions and threats 
with diplomacy and economic incentives. Although the US's initial response was to treat 
North Korea as other rogues, two factors prevented this. First, allies pressured the US to 
negotiate with North Korea. Second, North Korea's program was more advanced than 
the other rogues. It possibly already had a nuclear device. Further, North Korea's isola¬ 
tion would weaken the impact of any sanctions imposed. At that point, threats would 
achieve little where as incentives could induce compliance. 
The hypothesis is that US policymakers exhibit attribution bias in their perception of 
North Korea's nuclear program. Attributing its program to internal characteristics of the 
state leads to overperceptions of threat and possibly to excessive policy options. How¬ 
ever, since US policy has not been consistently harsh toward North Korea, less attribution 
bias may be expected. 
6Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 104. 
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Content Analysis 
In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 200 documents pertaining to 
North Korea between January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 12 the quantitative results 
indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are shown. 
Table 12. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences  
  # of co-occurrences %  
Dispositional (negative) 1 2 38.6 
Situational 6 2.1 
Note: Percentages based upon 290 references to the nuclear program of North Korea. 
Of the 290 separate references to the nuclear program of North Korea, 112 co- 
occurred with a negative reference to the character of North Korea, resulting in a 38.6% 
co-occurrence. In addition, there were 6 situational co-occurrences. These data indicate 
that US policymakers do not consistently attribute its nuclear program to dispositional 
factors. While the situational co-occurrences were not significant, the percentage of 
dispositional co-occurrences was much lower than for the other rogue states. In Table 13 
the breakdown of specific dispositional and situational references by type is shown. 
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Table 1 3. North Korea: Dispositional and Situational References 
DIRFCT rHARACTER 
pariah/'rogue 
isolated 
like Iraq 
ambitious 
fearful of the future 
INTENTIONS 
threaten 
US 
South Korea and Japan 
Northeast Asia 
international peace and security 
blackmail 
provoke destabilizing nuclear arms race 
undermine nonproliferation efforts 
sell nuclear weapons to outlaw regimes 
military confrontation 
target South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and others 
extort terms for reunification 
undermine regional security 
threaten use 
REHAVIOR 
dangerous 
created a crisis 
noncompliance with safeguards agreement and NPT obligations 
refused to permit full inspections 
internal repression 
at odds with international community 
developed ballistic missiles 
military build-up 
sold technology to rogue states 
threatened NPT withdrawal 
support for terrorism 
SITUATIONAL 
regional political instability 
economic hardship 
underlying sources to insecurity and instability 
difficult relations with Japan 
tensions on the peninsula 
4 decades of military confrontation 
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All of the dispositional references were negative and similar to those made about the 
other rogue states. North Korea's nuclear program was associated with its rogue charac¬ 
ter, hostile intentions, and unacceptable behavior. Yet these associations were not con¬ 
sistently made and the frequencies of the dispositional references by type in Table 14 
show that the majority of them were to North Korea's intentions. 
Table 14. North Korea: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type  
Type of Co-occurrence g %_ 
Direct Character 16 14.3 
Intentions 78 69.6 
Behavior 42 37.5 
Note: Percentages based upon 112 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of 
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (290): direct 
character, 5.5%; intentions, 26.9%; and, behavior, 14.5%. 
The most prominent references were to its intentions which occurred in 69.6% of the 
co-occurrences. In 64 of the references, the intent to threaten was mentioned. US policy¬ 
makers demonstrated the most concern over what North Korea might do, not its current 
behavior or character. 
These finding provide weak support for the hypothesis that the US executive branch 
exhibits attribution bias in its perceptions of North Korea's nuclear program. It did not 
consistently attribute its nuclear program to its character and occasionally acknowledged 
some situational factors which might contribute to its program. Why the US's perception 
of North Korea is different from the other rogues is not clear from the content analysis; 
however, pressure from allies and the advanced nature of its program account for the 
105 
willingness to negotiate. It may be that once the US began negotiating it felt the need to 
moderate its rhetoric and once an agreement was reached, it felt confident in giving North 
Korea the benefit of the doubt. 
Discussion 
In some ways the US perceives North Korea like the other rogues. It expresses con¬ 
cern over its past behavior and government and also compares its behavior to Iraq's. In 
1995, Secretary of State Christopher stated. 
This remains a dangerous world....We have to be constantly vigilant to make sure that 
countnes like Iraq and North Korea are denied weapons of mass destruction and pre¬ 
vented from menacing their neighbors. 7 
The majority of the references are to what North Korea would do if it obtained nuclear 
weapons. The focus upon its intentions suggests that the US perceives North Korea as a 
potential threat, but one that can be prevented. As Craig Johnston, Director of Resources, 
Plans, and Policy said. 
The agreements which will keep North Korea from developing a nuclear weapons 
capability will cost S22 million next year. Compare this with the $4 billion the 
Japanese and South Koreans are putting up! Compare this with the costs we will pay if 
the effort fails and North Korea develops nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the 
world.8 
7Warren Christopher, "Resources for Ueadership," (statement at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 20 September 1995) US Department of State 
Dispatch 6, no.39 (25 September 1995): 703-705, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on 
CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no. (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
8Craig Johnston, "Foreign Policy on the Cheap: You Get What You Pay For," 
(address before the Seattle World Affairs Council, Seattle, WA, 6 June 1995) US 
Department of State Dispatch 6, no.42 (16 October 1995): 743-745, reproduced in U.S. 
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Despite the perception of hostile intentions, the US has also shown an awareness of 
North Korea's security concerns. Although there were only six references to situational 
factors, they indicate that the US is not unaware of the external motivations of North 
Korea. Thomas McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, indicated 
this when he said, 
The breakup of the FSU has, in some cases, increased the level of insecurity of the 
FSU's former clients and their motivation to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-D.P.R.K.-are cases in point.9 
Additionally, the US made 65 references to the fact that the North Korean nuclear 
program was now frozen and would be dismantled. This references could be taken as an 
indication of North Korea's behavior, but were not counted as such because the US 
usually attributed the freeze to its negotiating powers or to the Agreed Framework and 
not to the willingness of North Korea. 
Both US statements and its policy reflect a less critical view of North Korea's nuclear 
program and a willingness to negotiate. Two factors may account for this. First, rela¬ 
tions with the US were beginning to improve with the end of the Cold War with the 
USSR. Second, North Korea's program is more advanced than the other states. The US 
may have felt more of an imperative to negotiate with North Korea because it could 
quickly assemble a nuclear device. However, the more moderate rhetoric may simply be 
Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public 
Affairs, June 1996.) 
9Thomas E. McNamara, "Rethinking Proliferation In the Post-Cold War Era: The 
Challenge of Technology," (address to the Wilton Park Special Conference, London, UK, 
8 December 1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.50, 51, 52 (December 1995): 
928-931, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington 
DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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attributed to the fact that the US was engaged in negotiations with North Korea and did 
not want to jeopardize any agreement. Once negotiations began, it nuclear program was 
often referred to as the "nuclear issue" or "nuclear situation" and not as a weapons 
program. In this way the threatening aspects of the program were downplayed as the US 
negotiated. 
US policymakers did not exhibit strong attribution bias in their statements about North 
Korea's nuclear program. Although they did not attribute it to situational factors, they 
did not consistently see it as a reflection North Korea's desire or hostile intentions. 
Despite this ambiguity, North Korea is still classed as a rogue which suggests that the US 
may have only moderated its rhetoric due to the negotiations; however, if the Agreed 
Framework is successful and relations improve, North Korea may move out of the rogue 
category. 
CHAPTER 10 
PAKISTAN 
Pakistan became interested in nuclear power as an energy source during the 1950s.1 It 
was not until 1972, after defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, that Pakistan secretly 
began its nuclear weapons program.2 By the early 1980s, it had made substantial pro¬ 
gress by acquiring materials and expertise from abroad. Pakistan's Cold War relationship 
with the US during the 1980s exempted it from the majority of US nonproliferation 
legislation and allowed it to acquire technology it otherwise would not have been able to 
obtain. There were also rumors of Chinese assistance is the form of weapons designs. 
By the late 1980s, the US was aware that Pakistan's program had reached the ad¬ 
vanced stages. After 1990, the US assumed that Pakistan was able to manufacture a 
nuclear device within a few days, although most intelligence sources agreed that Pakistan 
had chosen not to assemble a completed nuclear device. Any doubts about Pakistan's 
ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon were dispelled when it tested five nuclear 
devices in late May 1998 in response to a series of Indian tests earlier in the month. 
'Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Injluence 
Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), 116. 
2Spector, McDonough, and Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 97. 
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Pakistan is not a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The majority of its 
nuclear facilities are not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.3 
Pakistan has been willing to discuss joining the NPT, but only in tandem with India. 
Until its 1998 tests, Pakistan remained officially vague about its nuclear capabilities. 
US Relationship and Policy 
In comparison to the rogue states, Pakistan has enjoyed a better relationship with the 
US. Yet it has not been without tension. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, their rela¬ 
tionship has fluctuated between friendship and alliance to distrust and apathy.4 During 
the 1950s and again in the 1980s the two states cultivated a relationship based on security 
interests. At other times their interests have diverged because US security interests 
focused upon the USSR while Pakistan's main concern was India. For instance, when the 
US provided arms to India in 1962 in response to its conflict with China, Pakistan be¬ 
came distrustful of the US's commitment to it. The relationship also stagnated during the 
1970s while the US pursued detente with the USSR because Pakistan's strategic value as 
a buffer state was lessened.5 After the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the relation¬ 
ship again improved as the US began supplying Pakistan with large amounts of military 
aid in order to combat Soviet aggression. 
3
 Ibid., 101. 
4Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan. 
5
 Ibid., 10. 
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These types of fluctuations have also occurred in the US's relationships with several of 
the rogue states; however, there are some notable differences. First, unlike the rogue 
states, the US and Pakistan have not engaged in open hostilities. Downturns in relations 
with Iraq and Iran led to military actions and the severing of diplomatic ties. Second, the 
US sees Pakistan as pro-Western and acknowledges its democratic institutions. There is 
also cooperation between them on issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking. 
When the rogue image began to take shape in the late 1980s, Pakistan was considered 
a potential rogue;6 however, it remained outside of this category in part because of its 
continued strategic value. In addition, the history of cooperation between the two states 
allowed the US to identify in some ways with Pakistan and thus influenced its perception 
of Pakistan. Pakistan was seen in a better light and given the benefit of the doubt in 
many cases. For instance, the US is quick to acknowledge Pakistan's development of 
democratic institutions despite the fact that before 1988 there had not been a democra¬ 
tically elected government in almost two decades. In comparison, Iran is rarely given 
credit for its democratic institutions by the US. Thus areas of common interest and a 
history of co-operation create a better relationship and a basis for identification between 
the US and Pakistan. 
US nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan has been a mixture of sanctions and diplo¬ 
macy. In the 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear program was overlooked in order to maintain its 
friendship. The US finally took action in 1990 when President Bush failed to certify that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and sanctions were imposed under the Pressler 
6Klare, Rogue States, 25. 
Amendment. Despite tensions over the imposition of sanctions, the US has maintained 
diplomatic and economic ties with Pakistan. 
During the 1990s US policy has focused on diplomatic pressure and sanctions to 
induce India and Pakistan to implement confidence building measures and to work in 
parallel in cap and eventually roll-back their nuclear programs. White House officials 
feel that the sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment impede their nonprolifera- 
tion efforts rather than enhance them because it prevents closer relations. 
In 1998, new sanctions were imposed under the Glenn Amendment for Pakistan's 
testing of nuclear devices. Yet even this behavior has not prompted the US to implement 
sanctions of the variety imposed on Iraq or the other rogue states.8 Following Pakistan's 
tests, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while acknowledging the need not to 
reward India and Pakistan, also emphasized that these countries should not be isolated or 
made pariahs by the international community.9 
The hypothesis is that due to its relatively good relationship with Pakistan, US 
policymakers should attribute Pakistan's nuclear weapons program more to situational 
7Robin L. Raphel, "South Asia After the Cold War: India and Pakistan," (statement 
before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington DC, 14 September 1995) US Department of State 
Dispatch 6, no.39 (25 September 1995): 706-708, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on 
CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
8As of June 1998, the US had not terminated all economic and diplomatic ties with 
Pakistan. 
9Madeleine Albright, "NPT Will Not be Amended to Accommodate India, Pakistan," 
in USIS Washington File [database on-line]; available from http://www.usia.gov/ 
current/news/latest/9... It.html?/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml; Internet; accessed 8 
June 1998. 
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factors than internal characteristics. The US is able to understand and justify Pakistan's 
program because it identifies with it. Although this identification is not as close as with 
Israel, it is far more than with any of the rogue states. Since the program is not seen as 
reflecting the true nature of Pakistan, the program is seen as less threatening and the US 
is able to use more diplomatic tactics to deal with the underlying reasons for Pakistan's 
program. 
Content Analysis 
In conducting the content analysis, the source yielded 103 documents which pertained 
to Pakistan between the period January 1990 and May 1996. In Table 15 the qualitative 
results indicating the frequencies of dispositional and situational co-occurrences are 
shown. 
Table 15. Pakistan: Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences  
 # of co-occurrences %  
Dispositional (negative) 14 32.6 
Situational 31 72.1 
Note: Percentages based upon 43 references to the nuclear program of Pakistan. 
Of the 43 separate references to the nuclear program of Pakistan, 31 co-occurred with 
a reference to a situational factor resulting in a 72.1% co-occurrence. There were 14 co¬ 
occurrences with a negative dispositional reference resulting in a 32.6% co-occurrence. 
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These data indicate that US policymakers attributed the nuclear program of Pakistan 
more often to situational factors, than to its character. In Table 16 the breakdown of 
specific situational and dispositional factors is shown. 
TABLE 16. Pakistan: Situational and Dispositional References 
SITUATIONAL 
India 
tensions with 
possesses nuclear weapons 
political differences 
Kashmir dispute 
producing ballistic missiles 
Regional context of proliferation in South Asia 
National Security 
DIRECT CHARACTFR REFERF.NCF. 
democratic 
US ally 
INTENTIONS 
seeks ballistic missiles 
threat to regional and international stability and security 
BEHAVIOR 
concerning behavior 
unsafeguarded nuclear energy program 
inflexible policies and attitudes 
drains scarce national resources 
damages international relations 
undermines US interests 
Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons is clearly attributed to its security con¬ 
cerns, specifically its conflict with India and that state's possession of nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan's relationship with India was mentioned in 29 of the 31 situational co-occur¬ 
rences. 
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Although much fewer, the US does associate character with Pakistan's nuclear pro¬ 
gram. There was a 32.6% co-occurrence of negative character references with its nuclear 
program; however, these references vary significantly from those used in conjunction 
with the rogue states. None of the direct character references were negative. In addition, 
the behaviors and intentions mentioned refer to actions associated with Pakistan's nuclear 
program and not to other unacceptable types of behavior such as terrorism and human 
rights abuses. The frequencies of negative dispositional references by type in Table 17 
show that the majority refer to Pakistan's behavior. 
Table 17. Pakistan: Negative Dispositional Co-occurrences by Type  
Type of Co-occurrence g %  
Direct Character 0 0 
Intentions 5 35.7 
Behavior 9 64.3 
Note: Percentages based upon 14 negative dispositional co-occurrences. Each type of 
reference as a percentage of the total references to the nuclear program (43): direct 
character, 0.0%; intentions, 11.6%; and, behavior, 20.9%. 
These findings support the hypothesis that the US executive branch exhibits attribu¬ 
tion bias in its perception of Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan's program is driven by 
its security concerns with India and not because of the character of Pakistan. It is not 
indicative of Pakistan's true nature. 
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Discussion 
The US attributes Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to its security concerns with India. 
Although the US does find that Pakistan's program is of concern and could become a 
larger regional problem, it has demonstrated an understanding, if not acceptance, of the 
security concerns of Pakistan and has been willing to diplomatically deal with these 
concerns in order to try and cap its nuclear program. As President Clinton stated in 1995, 
As Secretary of Defense Perry noted during his recent visit to South Asia, we under¬ 
stand that both India and Pakistan need a capable defense. Secretary Perry's visit 
strengthened the framework for defense cooperation between the United States and 
each country, seeking to establish a transparency that would help them make realistic 
defense choices. The question is whether India and Pakistan can find reasonable 
solutions to their security requirements without nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, 
while moving in parallel to deal with their underlying differences.10 
The character references made in conjunction with the Pakistani program do not 
diminish the perception that security concerns motivate Pakistan's program. First, the 
only direct character reference made is to Pakistan's democratic character and is not 
negative. The references to Pakistan's democratic system are used to explain it nuclear 
program and justify flexible US policies. Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South 
Asian Affairs, said. 
'"William Clinton, "The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-Standing Relation¬ 
ship," (joint statement with Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, Washington DC, 11 April 
1995), US Department of State Dispatch 6, no.17 (24 April 1995): 356-358, reproduced 
in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of 
Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
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...we also realize that nuclear weapons are a political as well as a secunty issue in India 
and Pakistan. Possession of these systems has strong public support. Such opinion is 
important in the democratic systems of both countries. This presents us with a 
different kind of challenge from what we face in such states as Iraq or North Korea. 
We look to our strategy of cooperative engagement at the global, multilateral, bilateral 
levels as the best way to build a public consensus in favor of non-proliferation. While 
working to promote such a consensus, we continue to look for ways to encourage both 
governments to brake the nuclear weapons dynamic in their countries." 
Second, in 10 of the 18 dispositional references, a situational factor was also men¬ 
tioned.1" Thus when Pakistan is said to be inflexible, the US acknowledges that India is 
also inflexible and attributes this to their dispute. Similarly, when the US says that 
Pakistan's nuclear program is a threat to regional and international stability, it acknowl¬ 
edges that tensions with India are driving it. This makes the threat posed by Pakistan's 
nuclear program seem to be unintentional. 
Third, unlike the rogue states, references to its program are not linked to other issues 
and problems such as Pakistan's repression of minorities, involvement in narcotics trade, 
or the presence of terrorist groups within its borders. The behaviors linked to its nuclear 
program reflect the consequences to Pakistan of pursuing nuclear weapons such as dam¬ 
aging international relations and draining national resources. These behaviors do not 
give the impression that Pakistan is willing to violate international law or engage in other 
irresponsible behaviors. 
"Robin Raphel, "Non-proliferation Policy in South Asia," (statement before the 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Washington DC, 9 March 1995) US Department of State Dispatch 6, no. 12 
(20 March 1995): 222-224, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-Rom [CD-Rom] 4, 
no.l (Washington DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.) 
12There were 18 total positive and negative dispositional references. 
117 
US policymakers did exhibit attribution bias in their statements about Pakistan's 
nuclear program. Due to their friendly relationship, the US attributed Pakistan's program 
to the situational factor of its dispute with India. Character references were much less 
frequent and not extremely negative. Thus Pakistan is not developing nuclear weapons 
because of any inherent aggressive tendencies, but in order to defend itself. Even 
Pakistan's nuclear tests have not moved it into the rogue category. Although this does not 
mean the US supports Pakistan's nuclear program, it does indicate an awareness of the 
underlying factors which contribute to it and a willingness to adapt its policies to deal 
with them. 
CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
US nonproliferation policy has historically shown more concern over who has nuclear 
weapons than with the actual weapons. This trend has continued into the post Cold War 
period as the three states which have the most advanced programs, Israel, India and 
Pakistan are viewed with the least concern, while Libya, a state with little nuclear infra¬ 
structure, is classed as a rogue. This trend has also led to the discriminatory standards 
enforced among states because the US determines which states pose a nuclear threat 
based upon its perception of threat, not upon material capability. States discriminate in 
favor of other states with which they identify either through shared characteristics or 
interests. This occurs because of the need to defend and enhance its own identity. By 
perceiving states similar to itself to be good and moral, a state assures itself that it also is 
good and moral. Conversely, by perceiving states with which it does not identify as evil 
and immoral, a state also enhances its identity by distancing itself from characteristics 
and behavior it considers unacceptable. This in-group/out-group distinction explains the 
pattern of bias within US nonproliferation policy. The US has consistently pursued 
lenient policies toward in-group members and often failed to enforce existing legislation 
against them, while enacting harsh and punitive policies against out-group members. 
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This study has used one indicator, attribution bias, to show how the US perceives the 
nuclear programs of in-group and out-groups members differently. Attribution bias 
argues that the US will attributes the motivation behind a state's nuclear program differ¬ 
ently depending on whether that state is part of the in-group or out-group. The nuclear 
programs of out-group members will be attributed to the internal characteristics of the 
state thereby increasing the perception of threat. The programs of in-group members will 
be attributed to external factors thereby decreasing the perception of threat. 
A connection between the in-group/out-group distinction, US policy, and the presence 
of attribution bias was found in all five case studies. An antagonistic relationship with 
the US resulted in harsher nonproliferation policies and more dispositional co-occur¬ 
rences. Table 18 shows the percentages of dispositional and situational co-occurrences 
for each state in order of decreasing dispositional co-occurrences. 
Table 18. Dispositional and Situational Co-occurrences for All States  
 % dispositional (negative! % situational  
Libya 85.7 0 
Iraq 74.8 0 
Ir n 67.6 0 
North Korea 38.6 2.1 
Pakistan 32.6 72.1 
Two patterns emerge from this table. First, the worse the relationship with the US, the 
more often US policymakers attributed the state's nuclear program to its internal charac¬ 
teristics. Although it is arguable whether Libya or Iraq has the worst relationship with 
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the US, Iran does have a better relationship than either of them and North Korea's 
relationship has improved considerably since the end of the Cold War. Pakistan has the 
best relationship of all the states and its program was consistently attributed to the 
situational factor of its dispute with India. 
Second, the frequency of dispositional co-occurrences is inversely related to the 
program's level of development. Once again it can be disputed whether Libya, with its 
one reactor, or Iraq, whose program has been dismantled, has the least developed 
program; however, the programs of both these states are most consistently attributed to 
dispositional factors. North Korea's program, the most advanced among the rogue states, 
was attributed to dispositional factors only 38.6% of the time. Finally, Pakistan, which 
has been able to manufacture a device since 1990, received the least dispositional 
attributes. This pattern contradicts the idea that the US bases its threat perception on a 
program's level of development. 
The bias in the perception of US policymakers is most clearly revealed by comparing 
Iraq, Iran and Libya to Pakistan. The programs of these three rogue states were consis¬ 
tently attributed to their characters which were perceived to be aggressive and unac- 
cepting of international standards. In contrast, the Pakistan's program was attributed 
almost entirely to its dispute with India. This difference in perception accounts for why 
the US has continued to try and work with Pakistan on the issues driving its nuclear pro¬ 
gram even after it openly tested nuclear devices in 1998, while enacting broad sanctions 
and planning military strikes against these rogue states. 
The case of North Korea best illustrates the link between relationship, policy, and 
perception. Although North Korea was still classed as a rogue state, its relationship with 
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the US improved since the end of the Cold War. This improved relationship is reflected 
in the US's mixed policy toward North Korea. The US threatened sanctions and military 
action, but also used diplomacy and economic incentives to reach the Agreed Framework. 
Likewise, these mixed policies reflect the ambiguities in US rhetoric. North Korea's 
nuclear program was linked to its character 38.6% of the time. This was 29% less than 
the dispositional co-occurrences for Iran and only 6% higher than those for Pakistan. 
The North Korean case study also raises questions about the use of rhetoric by US 
policymakers. This study has argued that the rhetoric of US policymakers reveals 
perceptual biases regarding the nuclear programs of the rogue states and that these biases 
influence the harsh policies adopted toward these states. However, policymakers also use 
rhetoric for their own purposes: to influence the public and other countries and to 
legitimize the policies they have adopted. The perceptions of policymakers may shape 
their policies, but the rhetoric they use may be shaped by their policies. As North Korea 
showed, US rhetoric changed in response to a change in policy; it did not change the 
policy itself. 
Further research into this subject may include a longitudinal study on how US 
perceptions of individual states have changed over time and what prompted these 
changes. What factors seem most salient in the perception of threat from a state's nuclear 
program? Another avenue of inquiry may be to look at how closely the international 
nonproliferation regime mirrors US interests. It is undeniable that the US exerts 
significant pressure over the agenda of the nonproliferation regime, but is it simply an 
extension of US policy or has it developed significant independence? 
Effects of US Policy on Nonproliferation 
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Global concern over nuclear weapons springs from the fact that they are qualitatively 
different from conventional weapons. A nuclear detonation inflicts immediate and 
indiscriminate damage upon an enemy against which there is no defense. Their effects 
cannot be confined to a specific geography or to military targets. Although the threat of 
global nuclear war between the superpowers has diminished, nuclear weapons remain a 
threat. It does not take an arsenal filled with thousands of weapons, but only one to 
create a nuclear threat and provide a state with a disproportional advantage. After a 
certain point, numbers become meaningless in relation to nuclear weapons. These 
qualitative and quantitative differences conventional weapons drive the US effort to 
prevent other states from acquiring even one nuclear device. 
The goal of US nonproliferation policy is to prevent states from developing nuclear 
weapons and to convince states which already have to roll-back their nuclear programs. 
However, the US often adopts and implements policies which undermine this goal in the 
name of competing interests, economic factors, or domestic pressures. Three aspects of 
US policy undermine its long-term nonproliferation goals. 
First, US policy discriminates against some states and not others. By allowing some 
states to develop nuclear weapons and not others the US undermines the basic premise 
behind the nonproliferation regime—that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated; 
however, the regime also reflects the contradictions found in US policy. The regime 
legalizes nuclear weapons for some states and not others. The nuclear states cannot 
create an environment of trust and transparency by maintaining a monopoly over nuclear 
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technology and condemning states for developing these weapons when they retain 
thousands. These biases within US policy and the regime prejudice support for 
nonproliferation. 
Second, the US's original policy of technology denial to prevent proliferation has 
become increasingly ineffective. While this has slowed the nuclear programs of many 
states, but it has not stopped them because proliferation has become a political decision 
not a technological one. As nuclear technology becomes more available, it becomes 
more important for the US and the global nonproliferation effort to discover why a state 
decides to pursue nuclear weapons, what factors influence their decision, and how other 
states can motivate them to decide against nuclear weapons. 
Third, harsh sanctions and threats have not induced any state to renounce nuclear 
weapons. The states which recently abandoned their programs were subject to some 
sanctions and reprisals. All of the so-called rogue states have been subject to much 
harsher policies and none have given up their nuclear program voluntarily. It remains to 
be seen whether North Korea will comply with the terms of the Agreed Framework. 
Sanctions and threats often have the effect, as in Iraq, of hardening a state's resolve to 
develop nuclear weapons by providing it with attention and increasing its level of 
insecurity. 
These three weaknesses in US policy are exacerbated by misperceiving the 
motivations behind the nuclear programs of the rogue states. While these states most 
likely do have some aggressive motivations, there are also other factors driving their 
programs which US policymakers either ignore or overlook. By becoming more aware of 
the other concerns influencing these states the US may be able to create incentives for 
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abandoning their nuclear programs. When other factors are opportune, the US can 
influence a state to accept nonproliferation standards. The examples of Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, and Belarus show how it can use its resources and negotiating powers to induce 
states. 
Yet US policy cannot move a state toward a nonnuclear stance by itself. A state may 
be influenced by global nonproliferation norms which reflect US policy, but US policy 
by itself usually plays only a marginal role in changing nuclear stances. Three states 
which recently renounced nuclear weapons, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, said the 
US played little role in their decisions.1 The decisions to abandon their nuclear programs 
were all driven by domestic changes. Brazil and .Argentina brought liberal regimes to 
power and in South Africa the apartheid regime relinquished power. Prior to these 
changes, nuclear weapons were considered vital to the security of these nations as well as 
being symbols of national prestige and sources of power for the military and 
bureaucracies. US policy had little effect in companson to the domestic influences. 
US nonproliferation policies toward the rogue states have failed to end their nuclear 
ambitions. There may be little the US is capable of doing; however, until it becomes 
willing to explore methods of influencing these states aside from threats and sanctions, it 
will not know what it could accomplish and the nuclear programs of these states will 
continue. 
'Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 32, 70. 
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Member States of the I ■iher.il Security Community 
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